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AN EVOLVING MODEL FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY AND
HEALTH RULEMAKING: SMALL
REFINERS LEAD PH4SE-
DO WN TASK FORCE V. EPA
In one of his first attempts to carry out his campaign promise to create a
more efficient government, President Reagan issued Executive Order No.
12,291, Federal Regulation Requirements.' Among other things, this Order
is intended to "reduce the burdens [on industry] of existing and future reg-
ulations."2 It directs that, in promulgating new regulations, agencies may
not undertake action unless the potential benefits to society from the regu-
lation outweigh the potential costs.' The Executive Order reflects the
I. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982).
2. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 431
(1982).
3. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 128, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 431. The Order
appears to require a rigorous balancing of costs versus benefits of any proposed regulation.
Section 2 of the Order states, in pertinent part:
(b) Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society;
(c) Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the new benefits to soci-
ety;
(d) Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the alterna-
tive involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen; and
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the aggre-
gate net benefits to society, taking into account the condition of the particular in-
dustries affected by regulations, the condition of the national economy, and other
regulatory actions contemplated for the future.
Id. The Order explicitly states, however, that its requirements are subject to the provisions
of applicable laws. Id. See also infra note 9 and accompanying text. A great deal of confu-
sion surrounds the use of various terms that describe methods of measuring economic im-
pact. Terms such as "cost-benefit" and "cost-effectiveness" analysis have been interpreted to
mean different things. See, e.g., Kasper, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Decision-
making, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1013-15 (1977) (no agreement exists on the meaning of
"cost-benefit analysis"; use of the term ranges from intuitive to quantitative comparisons of
costs versus benefits).
To avoid confusion, this Note will use the terms "cost-effectiveness" and "cost-benefit" in
the following manner: The term "cost-effectiveness analysis" will be used to refer to the
economic technique of evaluating the costs and effectiveness of alternative methods of com-
plying with a standard. In an ideal case, the alternative methods would be equally effective.
The term "cost-benefit analysis" will be used to refer to the net, quantitative comparison of
the costs and benefits of a standard. The term "incremental cost-benefit analysis" will be
used to refer to strict economic analysis, or marginal analysis, by which the most economi-
1027
Catholic University Law Review
widespread attitude of the late 1970's and early 1980's that too much gov-
ernment interference with business operations,' and inadequately reasoned
government regulation,' have caused serious economic harm.6
At the time of the 1980 Presidential campaign, Congress also was con-
cerned with the effect of agency regulations on businesses, particularly on
small businesses. This led to the enactment of the Regulatory Flexibility
Act.7 The Act in general requires federal agencies to consider alternative
methods of regulating small businesses so that the economic impact on
them is lessened whenever possible.8 The alternatives considered, how-
cally efficient standard may be determined. Incremental cost-benefit analysis involves esti-
mating the point at which the cost of expanding an activity (the marginal cost) equals the
benefits gained from expanding the activity (marginal benefits). See Ruff, The Economic
Common Sense of Pollution, 19 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 69, 70-71 (1970).
4. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). Section 2(a) of the Order states that
administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information concerning the need for
government action. See also Douglas, A Perspective from the Private Sector, 13 NAT. RE-
SOURCES LAW. 643, 644 (1981) (experience of most businesses is that more government con-
trol usually means less efficient business operations).
5. 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). The Order is intended to ensure "well-reasoned" regulations.
6. See, e.g., Haveman & Christainsen, Environmental Regulations and Productivity
Growth, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 489, 508 (1981). The authors estimate that eight to twelve
percent of the slowdown in economic productivity that occurred during the 1970's was at-
tributable to environmental regulations alone; see also Ridker & Watson, Long-Run Effects
of Environmental Regulation, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 565 (1981) (discussing potential future
effects of environmental regulations on economic growth).
Public opinion polls also indicate that support for environmental programs that do not
consider costs may be weakening. In a poll conducted by the Opinion Research Corpora-
tion in 1977, and repeated in 1978 and 1980 by Resources for the Future, supportive re-
sponses to a strongly pro-environmental option declined over those three years. Individuals
were asked whether the following statement represented their opinion: "Protecting the envi-
ronment is so important that requirements and standards cannot be too high, and continuing
improvements must be made regardless of cost." The percentage of individuals indicating
agreement with the statement declined from 55% (a majority) in 1977 to 42% in 1980, a drop
of over 10 percentage points in three years. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ELEV-
ENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 406-07 (1980). A
sharp decline (58% in 1977 to 27% in 1980) was also seen in the percentage of individuals
willing to accept a slower rate of economic growth in order to protect the environment. Id.
at 409.
The number of individuals who felt that pollution control programs cost "more... [than
they are] worth," however, also declined-from 19% in 1977 to 13% in 1980. Id at 406-07.
Overall, the polls indicated that support for environmental programs in general remained
high through 1980. Id. at 407.
7. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1165, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12
(1982). Section 2 of the Act provides, in part, that "when adopting regulations to protect the
health, safety and economic welfare of the Nation, Federal agencies should seek to achieve
statutory goals as effectively and efficiently as possible without imposing unnecessary bur-
dens on [small businesses, organizations or governmental jurisdictions]."
8. Section 3(a) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to prepare and make
publicly available regulatory flexibility analyses. 5 U.S.C. §§ 603-604 (1982). Section 603
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ever, must be consistent with the stated objectives of applicable statutes. 9
In contrast to the concern for the economic impact of regulations articu-
lated by the Congress, the President, and federal agencies in the early
1980's, the attitude of government institutions in the early 1970's favored
protection of the environment and public health almost to the exclusion of
economics. Congress enacted a number of comprehensive statutes
designed to reduce pollution and protect natural resources and public
health including the Clean Air Amendments of 1970,10 the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972," and the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970.12 The Clean Air Amendments and the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act were described as "technology forcing" statutes because
they required stringent controls on pollution sources to be developed
within short periods of time.' 3 Legislative history for all three acts indi-
cates that costs of implementation were viewed as secondary to strict pollu-
tion control. '
requires an initial regulatory flexibility analysis at the time a rulemaking is proposed. This
analysis must include, among other things, a description of significant alternatives to the
proposed rule that would accomplish the applicable statutory objectives while minimizing
economic impact on small entities. Section 604 requires the agency to prepare a final regula-
tory flexibility analysis at the time a final rule is issued. This analysis must include, among
other things, a description of each of the significant alternatives to the rule which was con-
sidered, and a statement of the reasons for rejecting any of the considered alternatives.
Section 3(a) of President Reagan's Executive Order No. 12,291 specifically permits agen-
cies to combine implementation of the analysis required by the Executive Order "with any
Regulatory Flexibility Analyses performed under 5 U.S.C. 603 and 604." 3 C.F.R. 127
(1982). See also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 606 (1982) (§§ 603 & 604 do not alter in any manner standards otherwise
applicable by law to agency action).
10. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7706 (1982).
11. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-240, 86 Stat. 47, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
12. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1591, 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
13. See, e.g., Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1982), requiring in-
dustry to meet standards for ten major contaminants within strict national deadlines. Much
of the debate surrounding the 1970 amendments focused on whether it was feasible for in-
dustry to meet the deadlines imposed. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 32,904-05 (1970) (remarks
of Sen. Griffen) (the technology required to satisfy the 1970 Clean Air Amendments is not
available, and only a "pious hope" exists that such technology can be developed in time).
See generally Le Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes,
62 IowA L. REV. 771 (1977).
14. See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970) (under the Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1970, existing sources of pollution should either meet the standard or be closed
down, and new sources should be controlled to the maximum extent prossible); 116 CONG.
REC. 37,631, 37,345 (1970) (Occupational Safety and Health Act would impose substantial
costs on employers, but such costs are part of the cost of doing business) (remarks of Sen.
1984] 1029
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Increased concern for the cost of implementing these statutes has meant
that agencies charged with developing safety or environmental standards
must now consider the competing interests of economic and environmental
well-being. 5 The federal courts have played an important role in inter-
preting environmental legislation and in balancing the economic interests
of industry with protection of public health or natural resources. 16 The
Dominick and Sen. Yarborough, respectively); 117 CONG. REC. 38,810 (1971) (some disrup-
tion in economy would result from Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, possibly
forcing many marginal plants to close) (remarks of Sen. Bentzen). See also Sagoff, Economic
Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393, 1418 (1981) (environmental legisla-
tion of the last twenty years has consistently indicated a preference for national policies that
respond to concerns other than economic efficiency); Fisher, Controlling Government Regula-
tion. Cost-Benet Analysis Before and After the Cotton Dust Case, 36 AD. L. REV. 179, 204
n.214 (1984) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 established important principle
that so long as control technology exists, it should be used regardless of economic considera-
tions such as actual need for control).
By contrast, current efforts to develop acid rain legislation encounter serious obstacles in
the form of economic concerns. See Acid Rain Control (Part 1): Hearings on HR. 3400
Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983) (opening statement of Chairman Henry A. Wax-
man) ("legitimate concerns have been raised about possible adverse employment and utility
rate effects . . . [a]nd we will be unable to pass acid rain control legislation so long as it is
synonymous with massive job losses and electric rate increases.").
15. Agencies are faced with walking a very narrow line between the competing interests
of economic productivity and environmental well-being. A recent decision by the Colorado
Industrial Commission indicates that adjudicatory bodies are willing to hold federal agen-
cies liable for workers' environmentally caused injuries, even though the workers' exposures
remain within federally established exposure levels. The Colorado Industrial Commission
recently determined that a worker's death was the result of cancer caused by exposure to
radiation during 15 years' employment at a nuclear weapons plant. The worker had never
been exposed to radiation doses higher than the federal government's permissible exposure
level. The Commission found, however, based on expert testimony, that the government's
standard could result in extensive exposure to some body organs through inhalation or in-
gestion of radioactive materials. Thus, the Commission held that the Department of Energy
was liable for the worker's death, despite the fact that federal guidelines had been observed.
Wash. Post, Apr. 25, 1984, at A2, col. I.
16. See generally Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974). The author describes the role courts should take in reviewing
agency decisions and suggests that, while deference is owed to the expertise of the agency,
judges should carefully scrutinize the agency's stated rationale for its action, even if that
calls for examining complicated scientific information. Id at 511. This level of judicial
scrutiny, referred to as the "hard look" doctrine, is intended to provide searching review of
agency actions, without substituting judicial judgment for that of the agency. ld at 514. See
National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n. 126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) for an outline of the
historical development of the "hard look" doctrine.
In the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress specifically approved application of
"hard look" review to agency actions taken pursuant to the Clean Air Act. See H.R. REP.
No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 558 (1977). The House Report noted that courts should con-
tinue applying a thorough, comprehensive level of review in implementing the arbitrary and
capricious standard for judicial review under the Clean Air Act. Id The report noted fur-
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United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in
reviewing agency regulation under a number of substantive statutes, has
suggested a model that accommodates these legitimate but competing in-
terests in judicial review of agency action.17 Considerations comprising
the model include assessments of the amount of risk to health or environ-
ment involved; the degree to which an agency standard reduces that risk;
the technological feasibility of complying with the standard; and the de-
gree to which the agency must balance the economic impact of the stan-
dard against the goals to be achieved by it.
ther that, while there may be little practical difference between the substantial evidence and
arbitrary and capricious standards of review established by § 706 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, the intent of Congress was to retain the arbitrary and capricious standard for
actions taken pursuant to the Clean Air Act. Id See also infra notes 35, 96 and accompany-
ing text.
In general, application of the "hard look" doctrine to scientific issues focuses on substan-
tive review of agency decisionmaking as opposed to requiring extraordinary procedural safe-
guards. Thus, as Judge Leventhal stated in Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d
427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1973):
[While the court's role] is not in setting standards for emission control but in
determining if the standards as set are the result of reasoned decisionmaking ...
[e]ven this limited function requires that we foray into the technical world to the
extent necessary to ascertain if the Administrator's decision is reasoned. While we
must bow to the acknowledged expertise of the administrator in matters technical
we should not automatically succumb thereto, overwhelmed as it were by the utter
'scientificity' of the expedition.
In contrast to this view, others, particularly Judge Bazelon, have advocated reliance on
agency procedures to ensure adequately reasoned decisions involving technical issues.
Judge Bazelon's concurring opinion in International Harvestor Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d
615, 652 (1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring) espouses this view, explaining:
[I]n cases of great technological complexity, the best way for courts to guard
against unreasonable or erroneous administrative decisions is not for the judges
themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of each decision. Rather, it is to estab-
lish a decisionmaking process that assures a reasoned decision that can be held up
to the scrutiny of the scientific community and the public.
The U.S. Supreme Court has restricted, if not eliminated, application of this latter view by
its decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (reviewing courts may not impose procedures on an agency
beyond the statutory minima of the Administrative Procedure Act). Thus, the current ap-
proach to judicial review of agency science decisions apparently must incorporate strict sub-
stantive review of the agency's record and the agency's explanation of its decision as based
upon that record.
17. The following cases illustrate various elements of a general model for review of
environmental rulemakings: National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(agency standard must be technologically achievable by industry as a whole); Weyerhaeuser
v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (agency must balance cost of standard against
industry as a whole); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 941 (1976) (in absence of certainty of harm agency may regulate upon showing of
significant risk to human health); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (agency must attempt to quantify level of adverse harm as basis for regulation).
1984] 1031
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In Small Refiners Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the
extent to which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must balance
economic considerations against the concern for public health in promul-
gating new standards for lead in gasoline.' 9 The court also addressed the
extent to which the agency must show a risk to human health before im-
posing a final regulation. After finding in the EPA's rulemaking record a
significant risk to human health,2" the court held that extensive economic
analysis was not required in determining the final standard to be imple-
mented; the EPA need balance only the standard's overall cost to the in-
dustry as a whole.2'
In October 1982, the EPA, pursuant to section 211 (c)(1)(A) of the Clean
Air Act,22 imposed a new refinery standard regulating lead additives in
gasoline. 23 The new standard provided uniform treatment to large and
small refining companies, 24 despite the fact that small refineries previously
had been granted special treatment pursuant to section 211 (g)(2) of the
Clean Air Act.25 Section 21 l(g)(2) of the Act essentially provided that the
smaller the refinery, the greater the amount of lead the refinery could use
per gallon of gasoline produced. 26 Congress, however, specifically author-
ized the EPA's Administrator to use discretion in continuing this treatment
beyond October 1, 1982.27
The Small Refiners Task Force (SRTF), a coalition of twelve small re-
finers, challenged the new uniform standard as arbitrary and capricious,
alleging that the EPA had not considered adequately other methods of
18. 705 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
19. Id. at 525-26 (stating that review could not be restricted to health considerations
alone but must include consideration of the EPA's economic reasoning).
20. Id. at 531 ("significant risk" of adverse effects from lead justified the EPA's decision
to reduce lead content of gasoline). Lead, at relatively high dosage levels, can cause anemia,
fatigue, nerve damage and even death. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 8. Low blood lead levels are
associated with intellectual impairment in children. Small Refiners, 705 F.2d at 529.
21. Id at 536-37 (the EPA's balancing of health benefits against cost to the industry as a
whole was reasonable).
22. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A) (1982). This statutory
provision permits the Administrator of the EPA to regulate the use of additives, including
lead additives, in gasoline produced if, in the Administrator's judgment, such content may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health or welfare.
23. See 47 Fed. Reg. 49,324 (1982).
24. Id.
25. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(g)(2) (1982). See also infra
note 180.
26. See infra note 180.
27. See infra note 181.
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regulating the industry.2 8 SRTF maintained that a system of regulation
that would continue to provide special treatment for small refiners would
not so nearly threaten their financial survival.29 They proposed a dual
standard that would permit small refiners to use more lead in the gasoline
they produced than large refiners could use.3" SRTF argued that the EPA
had not shown the need to set a more stringent standard than the two-
tiered system would provide.3'
The court of appeals held that the record developed during the rulemak-
ing procedure showed atmospheric lead to be a significant risk to human
health,32 and that reductions of lead in gasoline resulted in reduced ab-
sorption of lead by populations studied.3 The court was troubled that the
EPA had not more fully explained the health basis for choosing its final
standard over some other standard.34 The court stated, however, that it
found a rational basis for the EPA's choice35 since EPA "had balanced
health benefits against cost to the industry as a whole."36
This Note will outline the historical treatment of environmental
rulemakings by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit. It will trace the development of the standard of review
applied in Small Refiners Lead Phase-Do wn Task Force v. EPA, including
28. Brief for Petitioner at 42-43, 48-49, Small Refiners Lead Phase-Down Task Force v.
EPA, 705 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
29. Brief for Petitioner at 31, 41-42, Small Refiners, 705 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
30. Id at 45-47. Specifically, SRTF proposed the use of a 2.50 grams per leaded gal-
Ion/I.10 grams per leaded gallon (2.50 gplg/1.10 gplg) standard. This would allow small
refiners to use 2.50 grams of lead per gallon of leaded gasoline produced while other refiners'
lead use was limited to 1.10 grams per leaded gallon produced.
31. Small Refiners, 705 F.2d at 527. See also Brief for Petitioner at 43-44, Small Refin-
ers. SRTF argued that the dual standard would result in significant reductions of blood lead
levels, yet would permit 25 to 30 small refiners, who could not meet the more stringent
proposed standard, to continue in business. Id at 31, 43-44. SRTF maintained that the
EPA must show that the additional lead reduction resulting from the more stringent stan-
dard was necessary for health reasons. Id at 46-47.
32. Small Refiners, 705 F.2d at 531.
33. Id. at 527-28.
34. Id. at 537.
35. Id at 536-37. While the court stated that the final standard imposed was reasonable
(hence, met the arbitrary and capricious standard of review imposed by § 307(d) of the
Clean Air Act), it further stated that the agency's action was supported by "'substantial'
evidence in the record viewed as a whole." Id at 526. There is a continuing trend among
courts to merge the standard of review under the "hard look" doctrine of the arbitrary and
capricious test with the substantial evidence test. See DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the
Integration of Law and Policy, 65 U. VA. L. REV. 257, 284-89 (1979) (substantial evidence
test and arbitrary and capricious test have converged as a result of strict review under arbi-
trary and capricious standard and the difficulty of reviewing policy judgments under sub-
stantial evidence standard). See also supra note 16; infra note 96 and accompanying text.
36. Small Refiners, 705 F.2d at 536.
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an examination of the impact on the Small Refiners decision of United
States Supreme Court cases interpreting the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970. Finally, the Note will consider the potential effects of
the Small Refners approach on future health and environment controver-
sies, suggesting that the D.C. Circuit should encourage the use of cost-
benefit analysis in circumstances where the state of knowledge regarding a
particular environmental hazard reflects a great deal of scientific certainty,
but should apply risk-benefit analysis" where uncertainty is great.
I. DEFINING THE LIMITS OF AGENCY DISCRETION IN REGULATING
ToxIc SUBSTANCES
A. U S Supreme Court Test.: The Benzene and Cotton Dust Decisions
Two recent and well-known cases before the United States Supreme
Court, Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute8 (Ben-
zene) and American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan39 (Cotton
Dust) addressed the limits of agency discretion in setting standards for haz-
ardous substances. Both of these decisions addressed the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) interpretation of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 197040 (OSH Act, or Act). Section 3(8) of
the Act requires OSHA to promulgate occupational safety and health stan-
dards4' that are reasonably necessary to regulate toxic materials or harm-
ful physical agents. Standards set by OSHA to regulate these substances
are also subject to section 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act which provides that
"[t]he Secretary. . .shall set the standard which most adequately assures,
to the extent feasible. . . that no employee will suffer material impairment
of health or functional capacity"42 even if the employee is regularly ex-
37. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
38. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
39. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
40. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590, 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982) [hereinafter cited as OSH Act].
41. Section 3(8) of the OSH Act provides the basic definition of the term "occupational
safety and health standard" as "a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use
of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment." 29 U.S.C.
§ 652(8) (1982). This definition raises two issues: first, the extent to which a proposed reme-
dial measure is "reasonably necessary or appropriate" under the Act; and second, the degree
of safety required to provide "safe or healthful employment or places of employment." For
example, "reasonably necessary" could mean economically reasonable; "safe or healthful"
could require absolute safety or health.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982). The full text of § 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act provides:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately
1034 [Vol. 33:1027
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posed to the hazard in the workplace. In both Benzene and Cotton Dust
the Supreme Court reviewed the agency's interpretation of sections 3(8)
and 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act, addressing what findings OSHA must make
regarding the health risks and economic impact of a proposed standard
before issuing a final regulation.
Benzene addressed OSHA's efforts to regulate the use of benzene in the
workplace. Benzene, a demonstrably hazardous compound, is commonly
used in the manufacture of such products as motor fuels, solvents, deter-
gents, pesticides and various other organic chemicals.4 3 Workers em-
ployed in gasoline service stations, petroleum refineries, coking operations,
chemical processing, and related industries are subject to low-level expo-
sure to benzene as a consequence of their employment.' Benzene's nor-
mal route of entry into the body is by inhalation of vapors, with
subsequent abosorption into the bloodstream. 45 Acute effects of benzene
inhalation, occurring at exposure levels ranging from 250 to 20,000 parts
per million (ppm), include dizziness, nausea, and, at the upper exposure
level, unconsciousness and death. 6
In addition to the acute effects of exposure to benzene (which workers in
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if
such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for
the period of his working life. Development of standards under this subsection
shall be based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and other such infor-
mation as may be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree
of health and safety protection for the employees, other considerations shall be the
latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the standards, and expe-
rience gained under this and other health and safety laws.
Id (emphasis added). While § 3(8) of the OSH Act applies to all occupational health stan-
dards, the plain language of § 6(b)(5) indicates that the section applies only to health stan-
dards involving toxic materials or harmful physical agents. Benzene suggests, however,
without deciding, that the second and third sentences of § 6(b)(5) may apply to all types of
health and safety standards. 448 U.S. at 612 n.l. As a whole, § 6(b)(5) probably indicates a
greater willingness on the part of Congress to tolerate a heavier economic burden on indus-
tries where serious threats to human health from toxic materials and harmful physical agents
are involved. See, e.g., Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 512 (by enacting § 6(b)(5), Congress chose
to impose separate and additional requirements that override the economic balancing im-
plied by § 3(8), whenever toxic materials/harmful physical agent standards are
promulgated).
43. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 615.
44. Id at 615-16. Gasoline service station attendants, by far the largest number of
workers exposed to benzene, were excluded from protection under OSHA's benzene regula-
tions due to the impracticality of devising protective measures. 43 Fed. Reg. 5919, 5923
(1978). This indicates that technological feasibility was an important limitation considered
by OSHA in promulgating standards under § 6(b)(5).
45. 43 Fed. Reg. 5920 (1978).
46. Id at 5921.
1984] 1035
Catholic University Law Review
most industries would not normally risk other than by accidental spills),
evidence has also linked exposure with serious blood disorders, such as
leukemia and aplastic anemia,47 and to chromosomal abnormalities.48 In
1969, on the basis of the evidence connecting benzene exposure to blood
disorders, the American National Standards Institute49 (ANSI) adopted a
national consensus standard of 10 ppm in eight hours with a ceiling con-
centration level of 25 ppm.5 In 1971, the Secretary of the newly created
Occupational Safety and Health Administration adopted the ANSI stan-
dard as the federal standard pursuant to section 6(a) of the OSH Act.5 '
By 1976, several studies had more firmly established the link between
benzene and leukemia, 2 particularly at relatively high levels of exposure
(200-500 ppm). On this basis, after an attempt to impose temporary emer-
gency standards,53 OSHA, in 1977, issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
47. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 617-18.
48. Id at 632-33; see 43 Fed. Reg. at 5921; Sullivan, The Benzene Decision. A Contribu-
tion to Regulatory Confusion, 33 AD. L. REV. 351, 352 (1981); Aksoy, Dincol, Erdem &
Dincol, Acute Leukemia Due to Chronic Exposure to Benzene, 52 AM. J. MED. 160 (1972);
Vigliani, Leukemia Associated with Benzene Exposure, 271 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI. 143
(1976) for descriptions of acute and chronic effects of benzene at various exposure levels. In
the latter study, for example, the author noted that 100% solutions of benzene had been used
in the past in several industries and workers had been chronically exposed to 200-500 ppm
benzene, with maximum peaks as high as 1500 ppm. Id at 144-45.
49. The American National Standards Institute, a nonprofit organization, set standards
for exposure to various workplace hazards. These standards, developed using input from
industry and labor union sources, were complied with by industry on a voluntary basis.
50. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 617.
51. Id Section 6(a) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1982), directs the Secretary to
promulgate safety and health standards as soon as possible or within two years from the date
of enactment. The Secretary, in this case, chose the ANSI standard to be the federal occupa-
tional health standard for benzene. See 43 Fed. Reg. 5919 (1978).
52. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), OSHA's re-
search arm, relied on several studies published in the mid-1970's to support its conclusion.
See, e.g., Aksoy, Types of Leukemia in Chronic Benzene Poisoning, 55 ACTA HAEMATO-
LOGICA 65 (1976); see generally Vigliani, supra note 48; see also McMichael, Spirtas, Kupper
& Gamble, Solvent Exposure and Leukemia Among Rubber Workers.: An Epidemiologic
Study, 17 J. OF OCCUP. MED. 234, 238 (1975) (demonstrating a high incidence of leukemia in
workers in the rubber tire industry who had been exposed to benzene over a period of sev-
eral years).
53. An emergency standard may be issued by OSHA pursuant to § 6(c) of the OSH Act,
42 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1982). This section of the OSH Act provides the Secretary with author-
ity to promulgate standards that are effective immediately if he determines that employees
are exposed to grave danger from toxic materials or harmful physical agents, or that the
emergency standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger. An emergency
standard for benzene was promulgated in 1977, reducing exposure to benzene from 10 ppm
to I ppm. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,516 (1977). On May 19, 1977, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit issued a temporary restraining order preventing the emergency standard
from taking effect. Id at 27,452.
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to establish a new permanent standard for benzene.54 The proposed stan-
dard reduced the permissible exposure level (PEL) to benzene from 10
ppm to 1 ppm." Significantly, the agency sought comments as to whether
the 1 ppm standard was the minimum "feasible" exposure level and
whether certain industries should be exempt from the standard.56 It did
not solicit comments as to whether benzene, at an exposure level lower
than 10 ppm, presented a significant health risk.
57
In determining a final standard, OSHA was also guided by its internal
policy regarding carcinogens. 8 The agency's carcinogen policy essentially
required industry advocates to provide proof that a safe level of exposure
to a given carcinogenic substance exists. 9 In the absence of such proof,
54. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,516 (1977).
55. Id.
56. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 623.
57. Id OSHA, however, did solicit comments as to whether certain industries should
be exempt from compliance, whether it was feasible to replace benzene in solvents with
other substances, and what the economic and environmental effects of the regulations would
be. 42 Fed. Reg. at 27,452.
58. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 624 n.19 (quoting hearing testimony of Deputy Director
Wrenn).
59. Id. OSHA's regulatory policy regarding carcinogens provided that in the absence of
a known or demonstrated safe level, or a "no-effect" level, of exposure to a carcinogen, no
safe level would be presumed and exposure would be reduced to the greatest extent feasible.
Id. This policy was similar to the policy underlying the Delaney Amendment to the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which prohibits the use in food or drugs of color or food
additives that have been demonstrated to cause cancer. 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c)(3)(A), 376
(b)(5)(B) (1982).
Support for OSHA's carcinogen policy rested on one of two generic models for cancer
initiation. The model on which OSHA relied, sometimes called the "one-hit" or "single-
event" theory, holds that cancer can be caused by "the interaction of one molecule of a
carcinogen with a critical receptor in one cell." Maugh, Chemical Carcinogens: How Dan-
gerous.Are Low Doses, 202 Sd. 37 (1978)., This interaction results in a permanent change in
the cell's genetic material-a change that may ultimately result in cancer. According to this
view, since the change is permanent, it can lead to cancer at any time, and may be caused by
exposure to a single carcinogen molecule. Thus, no safe level of exposure exists. Id Some
support for the single-event theory is found in the fact that the relationship between the
incidence of lung cancer and the number of cigarettes smoked daily follows a linear curve
down to fairly low incidence levels. Id at 38. Evidence from radiation-induced cancer also
supports this theory; but chemical carcinogens are subject to cellular barriers that do not
affect the entrance of radiation energy into cells. See infra note 213.
The second major model of cancer initiation holds that there is a threshold, or no-effect
level of exposure to a carcinogen. Below this level of exposure, cancer will not develop.
Support for this theory includes, among other things, the fact that some metals, such as
nickel and chromium, which occur naturally in mammalian enzyme systems, cause cancer at
high levels of exposure. Maugh, supra, at 39.
The single-event/no-effect controversy is complicated by the fact that, for practical rea-
sons, conclusive experiments to test for the development of cancer at human exposure levels
cannot be conducted. For example, ascertaining whether a significant risk of cancer exists at
typical human exposure levels would require the use of six million mice for an experiment
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OSHA'S carcinogen policy provided that no safe level of exposure would
be presumed and exposure to the carcinogen would be limited to the low-
est level possible without forcing the industry into bankruptcy.60 The final
standard for benzene, issued February 10, 1978, limited benzene exposure
to 1 ppm over an eight-hour period.6
The American Petroleum Institute (API), a trade association that repre-
sents the petroleum industry, challenged the new standard.6" On behalf of
its members, API argued that, before reducing the permissible exposure
level of benzene below 10 ppm, OSHA must conduct a cost-benefit analy-
sis comparing the benefits gained from reduced exposure with the cost to
the industry of complying with the standard.63 API also argued that
conducted over a period of one and one-half to two years. Practically speaking, such an
experiment cannot be conducted. Instead, experiments exposing small numbers of animals
to extremely high doses of carcinogens are conducted, and the data for the lower human
exposure levels are inferred from these experiments. Debate continues in the scientific com-
munity as to whether "no-effect" levels of exposure to carcinogens exist. See McGarity,
Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Ques-
tons.- Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L.J. 729, 733-36 (1979).
60. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 639; see Sullivan, supra note 48, at 351-52. Thus, in addition to
the technological limiting factor discussed supra note 44, standards promulgated under
OSHA's carcinogen policy were limited by economic feasibility. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 639.
OSHA interpreted the economic feasibility limitations to mean that an industry could be
forced to bear any costs that would not impair the industry's continued viability. Id Ac-
cording to OSHA's estimates, the cost to industry of imposing the final standard for benzene
was $266 million for capital investments, approximately $200 million for first-year operating
costs, and recurring annual costs of $34 million. OSHA estimated that 35,000 employees
would benefit from the regulation. Id at 628-29. OSHA determined that these costs did not
threaten the financial welfare of affected firms or the general economy. American Petroleum
Inst. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 581 F.2d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 1978), af'd sub
nom. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). While
OSHA did not quantify the benefits accruing from its standard, the Benzene Court inter-
preted OSHA's economic impact study of the standard to indicate relatively small benefits.
Benzene, 448 U.S. at 630. OSHA, on the other hand, determined that the benefits of the
proposed standard were likely to be appreciable. 43 Fed. Reg. 5941 (1978).
61. The final standard was codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (1979).
62. American Petroleum Inst. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 581 F.2d 493
(5th Cir. 1978), af'dsub nom. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607 (1980).
63. Essentially, cost-benefit analysis is an evaluation of what is spent or sacrificed in
relation to what is gained. When benefits exceed costs, the allocation of resources is cost-
justified. A different allocation of resources, however, might produce benefits that exceed
costs by an even greater amount. The latter choice would make the most sense from a
strictly economic point of view. See L. SILK, ECONOMICS IN PLAIN ENGLISH 58 (1978); see
also infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of cost-benefit analysis in the
context of OSHA regulations.
Cost-benefit analysis, however, is of limited value where the benefits to be realized include
preservation of human health. A strict cost-benefit approach would require imposing dollar
values on human life, a prospect that few would suggest. For example, in Cotton Dust, the
American Textile Manufacturers, Inc. (ATMI), conceded that a rigid cost-benefit calculation
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OSHA had not shown benzene imposed a significant risk to human health
at exposure levels below 10 ppm. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit upheld the challenge and invalidated the standard on the
basis that the 1 ppm limit was not supported by appropriate findings.
64
Specifically, the court held that OSHA had not shown that leukemia had
ever been caused by exposure to less than 10 ppm benzene, and that
OSHA had thereby failed to demonstrate that the reduction was
necessary.65
A five to four plurality of the United States Supreme Court affirmed.66
The Court determined that section 3(8) of the OSH Act required OSHA to
show that a proposed standard "is reasonably necessary and appropriate to
remedy a significant risk of material health impairment. '67 In the Court's
view, on the basis of section 3(8) alone, the agency must make a threshold
determination that a significant risk exists. In promulgating the benzene
standard, OSHA had not shown that reducing exposure to benzene from
10 ppm to I ppm benzene would result in added safety.68 The Benzene
Court concluded that the agency record supporting the 1 ppm standard did
not provide substantial evidence that long-term exposure to 10 ppm ben-
zene presents a probability of significant risk of health impairment.
69
Thus, the Court held that OSHA had failed to make the necessary thresh-
old showing that the new benzene standard would alleviate a significant
that places a dollar value on employee lives is not required. 452 U.S. at 507 n.26. However,
ATMI argued that OSHA must make a reasonable estimate, based on factual evidence, of
the expected risk-reduction benefits of its standard, and then balance these benefits against
cost. ATMI maintained that the agency must find that the reduction in health risk is signifi-
cant based on consideration of the costs of the standard. Id at 506-07 n.26. Nonetheless, as
OSHA's Secretary pointed out, ATMI's characterization of the cost-benefit exercise would
involve evaluating all benefits that would accrue, including the intangible ones to human
health. To balance these benefits against costs requires quantifying the value of human life.
Id See also infra note 238. For a full discussion of Cotton Dust, see infra notes 82-94 and
accompanying text.
64. American Petroleum Inst., 581 F.2d at 505.
65. Id at 510.
66. Benzene, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). The plurality opinion was written by Justice Stevens
and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart. Justices Powell and Rehnquist
wrote separate concurring opinions. Justice Marshall wrote the dissent, and was joined by
Justices Brennan, White and Blackmun.
67. Id at 639. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of § 3(8) of the
OSH Act. Several courts have relied on the Benzene interpretation of the significant risk
test. See ASARCO, Inc. v. OSHA, 647 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1981) (invalidating an arsenic stan-
dard); Pratt & Whitney v. Secretary of Labor, 647 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying signifi-
cant risk of harm test to OSHA's authority to issue citations for violations of safety
practices); Texas Indep. Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1980) (invalidat-
ing the cotton dust standard for the cotton ginning industry).
68. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 653.
69. Id
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risk of harm to the workers in the industry.7 ° In light of its holding, the
Court did not reach the issue of whether OSHA was required to use a cost-
benefit analysis in promulgating a final benzene standard.71.
Concurring in the decision, Justice Powell maintained that the agency
also must demonstrate that the benefits of the standard are reasonably re-
lated to the costs of its implementation.72 In his view, the provisions of
sections 3(8) and 6(b)(5), respectively requiring a health standard to be
"reasonably necessary" and "feasible," necessitate that costs of implement-
ing the standard be proportionate to expected health and safety benefits.7 3
Justice Powell observed that the Act's legislative history represented a leg-
islative compromise between the interest of workers in having a safe,
healthful workplace and the industry's need to function without undue in-
terference. 74 He maintained that OSHA's reading of the Act's "feasibility"
requirement under section 6(b)(5) would permit the promulgation of stan-
dards without regard to economic effects unless those effects would cause
massive dislocation within an industry.7 5 Thus, the agency's interpretation
would require industries to provide totally risk-free environments, a result
that Congress clearly had not intended.76
70. Id at 639, 653, 659. The Court stated that the Secretary failed to meet his threshold
responsibility of proving that the standard was necessary to remedy a significant health risk.
Id. at 639, 653.
71. ld at 640.
72. Id at 667 (Powell, J., concurring).
73. Id
74. Id. at 668 n.5. See statement of Senator Williams, OSH Act sponsor, 116 CONG.
REC. 37,342 (1970) (OSH Act is "good-faith effort" to balance competing needs of workers
and industry).
75. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 667-68. "Massive dislocation" within an industry is apparently
synonymous with "bankruptcy" of the industry. Cf Industrial Union Dep't AFL-CIO v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (interpreting OSHA's asbestos standard, the
court stated: "Congress does not appear to have intended to protect employees by putting
[all of] their employers out of business."). Other descriptions of what would represent an
intolerable amount of harm to the industry include costs that would "impair the viability of
industries subject to the regulation" and costs that "ruin . . . entire industries." Benzene,
448 U.S. at 639, 641 (quoting OSHA's views of intolerable economic harm). The Industrial
Union court also noted that, to determine feasibility, it might be necessary to consider other
adverse economic impacts on an industry, such as the likelihood of creating undue concen-
tration of an industry where only a few leading firms could meet the standard, or the likeli-
hood of damaging the industry's competitive standing in a world market. Industrial Union,
467 F.2d at 478.
76. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 669. Justice Rehnquist also concurred in the result, but as-
serted that the language of § 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act was completely precatory, and that the
resulting uncertainty of interpretation indicated that the Act impermissibly delegated legis-
lative power to administrative agencies. Id at 675, 686. Writing for the dissent, Justice
Marshall contended that the Secretary complied with the plain meaning of § 6(b)(5). ld at
688-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Soon after issuing Benzene, in American Textile Manufacturers Inst. v.
Donovan (Cotton Dust),77 the Court addressed squarely the issue left un-
resolved by the Benzene plurality-whether the OSH Act required cost-
benefit analysis as a prerequisite to issuing safety standards. Pursuant to
the OSH Act of 1970, OSHA had promulgated new, restrictive standards
for the regulation of cotton dust particles in textile industry workplaces in
order to reduce the risk of byssinosis, a respiratory disease caused by these
particles.78 A group of cotton textile manufacturers challenged OSHA's
regulations, alleging that the Act required OSHA to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis before issuing such regulations.79 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the cotton dust standard
as promulgated by the agency on the basis that the agency had demon-
strated a risk of health impairment from exposure to cotton dust. More-
over, the court held that the agency was required only to relate the costs of
the standard to the industry as a whole. The court ruled that Congress had
struck the balance between costs and benefits in favor of workers who
would be exposed to the hazard.80
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to decide the narrow
issue of what relationship between costs and benefits the agency must
demonstrate before promulgating a standard. 8' The Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court's decision, holding that the Act itself does not re-
quire OSHA to perform cost-benefit analysis in promulgating necessary
standards for substances that pose significant risks to workers.82 The Cot-
ton Dust Court suggested that so long as the agency demonstrates that a
standard will reduce the risk posed by a toxic substance, it need not at-
tempt to minimize the economic impact of the standard by using cost-ben-
77. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
78. The term "cotton dust" refers to small cotton particles that enter air streams as
particulates when cotton fibers are processed. The cotton dust particles, which may contain
a mixture of bacteria, fungi, soil, pesticides and other contaminants, are inhaled and become
lodged in lower respiratory passages, causing a range of disabilities collectively known as
byssinosis. The most severe form of byssinosis ("brown lung") includes symptoms of
breathlessness and tightness of chest. See Sullivan, The Cotton Dust Decision: The Confu-
sion Continues, 34 AD. L. REV. 483, 484 (1982); see also Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 495-97 nn.
6-9 and accompanying text (discussing health effects associated with cotton dust).
79. American Fed'n of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The industry
wanted OSHA to adopt the proposed industry standard of 400 pLg/m 3 of respirable dust as
the permissible exposure level (PEL) rather than OSHA's proposed PEL standard of 200
Lg/m 3. In addition to maintaining that cost-benefit analysis was required, the industry ar-
gued that OSHA had failed to consider its proposal. Id at 652, 662.
80. Id. at 663-64.
81. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 506.
82. Id at 512.
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efit balancing.83 Rather, it held that the language of the OSH Act requires
the agency to reduce exposure to the substance to the lowest level "feasi-
ble."84 The test for feasibility is "limited only by the extent to which...
the reduction is 'capable of being done.' "85 The Court interpreted the lan-
guage of section 6(b)(5) to mean that Congress had already considered the
relationship between costs and benefits, and had placed the benefit of
worker health above all other considerations except industry's ability to
comply with the standard.86 It reasoned that a standard promulgated by
the agency based upon a balancing of costs and benefits might undercut
the requirements of section 6(b)(5) if it were to result in a different balance
than that struck by Congress.87 Thus, in the Court's view, the "feasibility"
analysis mandated by the OSH Act was directed only toward determining
whether the standard imposed was technologically and economically
achievable, not whether the benefits numerically outweighed the economic
costs of the standard.88
Although the Court concluded that the OSH Act does not require that
the agency conduct a cost-benefit analysis, it suggested in dicta that the
feasibility requirement might nonetheless encompass considerations of
whether the standard imposed is necessary and appropriate.89 This view is
based on the language contained in section 3(8) of the OSH Act defining
occupational safety and health standards as those "reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of em-
ployment."9 While the Benzene Court relied on this statutory provision to
support its decision that the agency must make a specific finding of signifi-
cant health risk before attempting any regulation whatsoever,9 ' the Cotton
Dust Court implied that it could be interpreted to restrict the agency's dis-
cretion in implementing standards under the feasibility test.92 It is clear
83. Id at 509.
84. Id. at 508.
85. Id at 508-09.
86. Id. at 509.
87. Id
88. Id at 513-14. The Court stated that Congress did not intend any further balancing
by the agency before setting toxic material and harmful physical agent standards than that
the standards be economically and technologically achievable.
89. Id. at 513-14 n.32. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan set forth the following
illustration: "[If the use of one respirator would achieve the same reduction in health risk
as the use of five, the use of five respirators was 'technologically and economically feasible,'
and OSHA thus insisted on the use of five," then additional restrictions on OSHA's discre-
tion to choose between the one- and five-respirator standards might be required. Id
90. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
9 1. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
92. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 513 n.32.
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from Cotton Dust, however, that section 3(8) cannot be interpreted to im-
pose upon the agency an overriding requirement of cost-benefit analysis,
as this interpretation would eviscerate the requirement in section 6(b)(5)
that risks be reduced to the extent feasible.93
Together Benzene and Cotton Dust developed a two-pronged approach
for testing the validity of agency-promulgated health standards under the
OSH Act.9 4 First, an agency must show that the new standard will result
in the reduction of a significant health risk. Second, an agency must show
that the standard set is both technologically and economically achievable
by the industry affected. The agency is not required to perform cost-bene-
fit analysis unless specifically mandated to do so by Congress.
Although the Supreme Court opinions addressed only agency regulation
under the OSH Act, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, in earlier cases, employed a similar analysis when
presented with challenges to agency action taken under other environmen-
tal statutes.95 In reviewing standards promulgated by the Environmental
Protection Agency under the Clean Air Act of 1970 and Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972,96 the D.C. Circuit has required the agency
93. Id at 513. Justice Brennan recited without deciding, however, ATMI's argument
that issuance of a single health standard, without cost-benefit balancing, might result in a
serious misallocation of resources available to protect worker health if other hazards exist in
the workplace. Id at 509 n.29. He pointed out that the issue of cost-benefit analysis arises
more properly when the need exists to choose from among several standards that regulate
different varieties of health hazards. Id Benzene and Cotton Dust each involved a single
toxic material or harmful physical agent.
94. See Sullivan, supra note 78, at 489. Sullivan points out that, when read in conjunc-
tion, the Benzene and Cotton Dust cases hold that once OSHA has demonstrated to the
court's satisfaction that a significant risk exists, then a cost-benefit analysis need not be per-
formed by the agency. He suggests, however, that a cost-benefit analysis might be required
to show that a health risk is significant.
95. See, e.g., supra note 17 and accompanying text; see generally Hadley & Richman,
The Impact of Benzene and Cotton Dust: Restraints on the Regulation of Toxic Substances, 34
AD. L. REV. 59 (1982). The authors state that, while Benzene and Cotton Dust involved
statutory construction of the OSH Act, it is useful to read other health, safety or environ-
mental statutes with these two Supreme Court decisions in mind. They maintain, for exam-
ple, that the "reasonably necessary and appropriate" limitations placed by § 3(8) on the
literal language of § 6(b)(5) in Benzene were necessary in order to avoid an overbroad dele-
gation of legislative authority to a federal agency by Congress. Id at 70. As with the OSH
Act, other health, safety and environmental statutes represent a balance struck by Congress
to limit the discretion of federal agencies in promulgating what may be arbitrary measures
to curb various harms, while permitting agencies to exercise enough authority to deal with
the complex scientific and economic issues they face.
96. Under both § 307(d)(9)(A) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (1982),
and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1375 (1982), the standard
for judicial review is the "arbitrary and capricious" test as derived from the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). The Occupational Safety and Health Act, on
1984] 1043
Catholic University Law Review
to show that the standards chosen will result in a measurable benefit to the
public, and that the affected industry can technologically and economically
achieve the standard imposed. The D.C. Circuit has not required exten-
sive economic analysis in setting standards.
B. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit-
Factors Considered in Setting Environmental, Safety and Health
Standards
1. Substantial Risk
In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA,97 the court addressed the EPA's
promulgation of secondary ambient air quality standards under the Clean
Air Act.98 Secondary air quality standards are those standards designed to
protect the public welfare by limiting the deleterious effects of pollution on
diverse categories of interests such as property, soil, water, crops, visibility,
weather, wildlife and personal comfort and well-being.99 In an informal
rulemaking completed in 1971, the EPA promulgated a national secondary
air quality standard for sulfur oxides pursuant to sections 108 and 109 of
the Clean Air Act."° The standard limited the annual arithmetic mean
amount of sulfur oxides to sixty micrograms per cubic meter of air.'0 ' The
the other hand, authorizes judicial review based on substantial evidence on the record as a
whole, as derived from 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). The substantial evidence test has been
considered a stricter standard for review of agency actions by courts. In recent years, how-
ever, the distinction has become less clear. Particularly because the so-called "hard-look"
doctrine evolved from the "arbitrary and capricious" test, courts have begun to view the two
tests as equally rigorous. For example, in Pacific Legal Found. v. Department of Transp.,
593 F.2d 1338, 1343 n.35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979), the court stated that
"the emerging consensus of the Courts of Appeals [is] that the distinction between the arbi-
trary and capricious standard and substantial evidence review is largely semantic ... "
Moreover, a number of cases involving the "arbitrary and capricious" standard have applied
the standard of judicial review used in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d
841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971), a substantial evidence case. See
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)
(collecting cases that have relied on Greater Boston in addressing the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard). See also supra notes 16, 35.
97. 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
98. Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1982) [herein-
after cited as Clean Air Act]. Section 108(a)(l) of the Act requires the Secretary to publish a
list of air pollutants that, in his judgment, have an adverse effect on public health or welfare,
and the presence of which results from numerous mobile and stationary sources. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7408 (1982). In developing this list, the Secretary, under § 108(b)(1), is to issue to the
states and appropriate air pollution control agencies information on air pollution control
techniques, including data relating to "technology and cost of emission control." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7408(b)(1) (1982).
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7602 (1982).
100. 36 Fed. Reg. 1502 (1971).
101. Kennecott Copper, 462 F.2d at 847.
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agency reached this figure on the basis of conclusions contained in an air
quality criteria paper published in 1969 by the United States Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW).'° 2 Section 109 of the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970 specifically authorized the EPA to use the HEW's air
quality criteria papers in devising ambient air quality standards.' 
0 3
The Kennecott Copper Corporation challenged the final standard, em-
phasizing that the summarizing paragraph of the air quality criteria docu-
ment demonstrated damaging effects of sulfur oxides only at
concentrations of eighty-five micrograms per cubic meter or greater. 04
The corporation alleged that the agency had therefore failed to justify its
selection of the lower standard of sixty micrograms per cubic meter.'0 5
The EPA argued that the summarizing paragraph of the document was not
conclusive and that the body of the document referred to lower figures.
Alternatively the agency argued that the sixty-microgram figure was justi-
fied on the basis of anticipated future effects and the margin of safety
needed to avoid the adverse effects that occur at the eighty-five-microgram
level.'0 6 The court remanded the matter to the EPA for further explana-
tion of why the more stringent sulfur oxide standard was chosen. 10 7 The
circuit court held that the agency had not provided a sufficient indication
of the basis for the sixty-microgram figure and that without further expli-
cation the court could not resolve whether the agency's action was an
abuse of discretion.1
0 8
Although secondary air quality standards are designed to protect the
102. Id. at 848 n.9.
103. Prior to enactment of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, air quality criteria were
promulgated by the Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, under the Clean Air Quality Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1857-1857g (1963) (amended 1970). The Administrator of the EPA was author-
ized by § 109(a)(l) of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 to issue ambient air quality stan-
dards based on criteria developed by the Secretary under the prior act. Pub. L. No. 91-604,
84 Stat. 1676, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1) (1982).
104. Kennecott Copper, 462 F.2d at 848.
105. Id
106. Id
107. Id at 850-51.
108. Id at 849. Under § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, informal rulemaking,
such as that permitted by the Clean Air Act, requires agencies to issue notice of any pro-
posed action, followed by a comment period, and finally by a concise general statement of
basis and purpose of the adopted rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1982). The court showed some
deference to agency rulemaking in the environmental context when it declined to require the
EPA to address in detail, in its statement of basis and purpose for the new rule, all comments
submitted, stating that "as applied to environmental regulations, produced under the tension
of need for reasonable expedition and need for resolution of a host of nagging problems, we
are loath to stretch the requirement of a 'general statement' into a mandate for reference to
all the specific issues raised in comments." Kennecott Copper, 462 F.2d at 850.
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general public welfare rather than public health, the Kennecolt Copper
court's holding prefigured the requirement developed in Benzene that a
showing of specific material risk be made before an agency can regulate
hazardous substances. Similar to Benzene, Kennecott Copper held that the
EPA had not supported its rulemaking decision with adequate evidence
showing the need for the standard chosen. °9 This decision represented
one of the D.C. Circuit's earliest attempts to address the complexities in-
volved in agency regulation of toxic substances. The underlying issue,
however, of exactly what threshold showing an agency must make to sup-
port the standard it has selected was left unresolved.
Four years later, the D.C. Circuit addressed this issue in Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA." ° Under section 211(c)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA was
granted broad authority to regulate fuel additives in gasoline."' This stat-
utory provision permitted the EPA to control or prohibit the sale or manu-
facture of any fuel additive whose emission products would "endanger the
public health or welfare."" 2 In 1973, because of the perceived health haz-
ard from automobile lead emissions, the agency exercised its statutory au-
thority, and adopted standards that required reduction in the lead content
of gasoline to .5 grams per gallon (gpg) by January 1979.' 
Industry refiners and lead-additive producers challenged the standards,
alleging that the EPA had incorrectly interpreted section 211 (c)(1)(A) in
terms of the threshold determination to be made before imposing new
standards.'"' Ethyl Corporation argued that the EPA could not promul-
gate emission limitations based on the mere finding that leaded gasoline
presents a significant risk of harm to the health of urban populations;
rather, the agency must prove that lead in gasoline had caused actual
harm. "'15 The refiners maintained that the agency was not empowered to
109. Kennecott Copper, 462 F.2d at 850. See also Jorling, The Federal Law ofAir Pollu-
tion Control, FED. ENVTL. L. 1063 (1974). The author states that the insufficient evidentiary
basis for the EPA's standard in Kennecott Copper was due to a general inadequacy of knowl-
edge available at that time concerning air pollution control. He argues that the strength of
any regulatory system rests on the accumulated knowledge that can be used to support
regulations.
110. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(o (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (1982)).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(f) (1970). The language of this section was amended in 1977 to
specifically endorse the court's holding in Ethyl Corp. The statute now permits the EPA to
regulate fuel additives when, in the Administrator's judgment, emissions products of the
additive "may be reasonably anticipated to endanger" the public. Section 211 (c)(1)(A) of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A) (1982).
113. 38 Fed. Reg. 33,734. The final regulations were codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80.20 (1975).




assess risks or make policy judgments regarding use of lead in motor fu-
els." 6 They further urged that the agency could not regulate lead in fuels
on the basis of the cumulative impact of lead from all sources, including
sources other than mobile emissions, but rather must show specifically that
lead in gasoline caused harm." 7
The D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA's interpretation of section 211 (c)(1)(A)
of the Clean Air Act." 8 The court held that the agency was empowered by
the statute to make policy judgments, particularly since some of the issues
involved in promulgating environmental regulations are "on the frontiers
of scientific knowledge," and therefore insufficient data was available to
make a fully informed factual determination of whether lead in gasoline
caused actual harm to human health. "9 Although acknowledging that
studies in the record presented conflicting views of the impact of lead from
mobile sources on human health, the court held that the agency's analysis
of the record and assessment of potential risks was within the scope of the
Act's directive.'12  The circuit court also held that, while airborne lead
alone might not pose a threat to human health, the EPA could regulate
sources of airborne lead, such as gasoline lead emissions, so long as the
agency found that they contributed to the risk in such a way as to signifi-
cantly endanger human health. 12 ' The court stopped short of requiring a
factual showing that lead in gasoline by itself produces an identifiable in-
crement of lead in the human body and that this increment causes a health
hazard. 1
22
Thus, the Ethyl Corp. court established and defined "significant risk" as
the appropriate threshold showing that permits agency action.'23 The sig-
116. Id
117. Id.
118. Id at 7.
119. Id at 26-27 (quoting Industrial Union Dep't AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,
474 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). Industrial Union reviewed OSHA's authority to promulgate occupa-
tional health standards for asbestos under §§ 3(8) and 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act.
120. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 10, 54-55.
121. Id. at 29-32.
122. Id The court stated that where evidence is difficult to obtain, uncertain, or conflict-
ing due to limited scientific knowledge, the court would not demand "rigorous step-by-step
proof of cause and effect." Id at 28. On the other hand, Judge MacKinnon's dissent in
Ethyl Corp. predicated the EPA's authority to regulate lead on the ability of EPA to show
that lead in gasoline was directly linked to lead in the human body. Id. at 95 (MacKinnon,
J., dissenting).
123. Id at 13 (a "significant risk" under § 21 l(c)(l)(A) is one that is likely to endanger
health). In defining "significant risk," the court drew heavily from the decision in Reserve
Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc). In Reserve Mining, the Eighth
Circuit addressed the issue of whether the EPA could restrict the Reserve Mining Co.'s
discharge of asbestos fibers into Lake Superior. Although asbestos had been shown to cause
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nificant risk test, as outlined by Ethyl Corp., rather than requiring a strict
cause-and-effect showing of harm, requires an assessment of the risk to
human health that might result from exposure to the hazard. By allowing
the EPA to assess the risk from lead in gasoline, the Ethyl Corp. court
essentially based its decision upon a risk-benefit'24 analysis in which the
risk of health impairment from exposure to lead was weighed against the
benefits of continued use of lead by the refining industry. The court deter-
mined that the risks of health impairment outweighed the benefits of con-
tinued unrestricted use, and consequently upheld the EPA's lead phase-
cancer when inhaled, whether it could cause cancer as a result of ingestion was unknown.
However, cancer as a result of ingestion was an accepted medical theory. The court ad-
dressed the issue of risk and decided that, in this case, the danger was great but unproved. It
refused to impose an immediate injunction on the company, but placed it on a compliance
schedule requiring it to phase out its discharges. Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d at 499-500, 514-
20.
124. For a discussion of risk-benefit analysis, see generally Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of
Scientific Information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 371 (1974). The
authors discuss general situations in which use of risk-benefit analysis is appropriate. Ap-
propriate situations include those situations where information is available but indefinite
and those situations in which information is unavailable and unobtainable for either practi-
cal or theoretical reasons. Id. at 392-95. In balancing the risks imposed by a substance or
activity against the costs of forgoing use of the substance or activity, the decisionmaker must
consider "both the probability of the occurrence of an adverse impact and the magnitude of
the impact." Id at 425 (emphasis added). Thus, a risk with a low probability of occurrence
but a potentially catastrophic adverse impact might outweigh the economic advantages of
the substance or activity. Judge Leventhal applied this view to the regulation of carcinogens
when he stated, in a panel discussion in 1976, "[w]hen the consequences of an action are
very great, as in the case of carcinogenic chemicals, a lower probability of catastrophic ef-
fects will justify action by a court to protect the public." LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC UNCER-
TAINTIES OF WEATHER MODIFICATION 73 (W. Thomas ed. 1977) (panel discussion). See
Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d at 536 (the possibility of cancer resulting from dis-
charge of wastes is sufficient to outweigh continued discharge activity, even though the oc-
currence of cancer is based on an unproven medical theory); cf. Carolina Environmental
Study Group v. United States, 5 10 F.2d 795, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (discussing the probability
of a major nuclear disaster, the court stated "the probability of an occurrence may be so low
as to render it almost totally unworthy of consideration").
As Gelpe & Tarlock point out in their discussion of the use of maverick scientific expert
witnesses, a decisionmaker must be prepared to draw a line between "the valid refusal to
consider spurious claims of risk and the invalid refusal to consider real risks that are of low
probability or impossible to prove." Gelpe & Tarlock, supra, at 426. This distinction is
particularly important in considering arguments whether risk-benefit analysis is constitu-
tionally permissible. It is generally considered that due process requires society's right to
prohibit an activity (whether individual freedom or discharge of wastes into a lake) be lim-
ited to cases where a causal relationship between the alleged harm and the prohibited activ-
ity can be demonstrated. In contrast to showing actual harm, risk-benefit analysis involves
taking actions where a causal relationship is presumed but not demonstrated. As Gelpe &
Tarlock maintain, however, risk assessment is simply an alternative standard for establish-
ing cause that is particularly useful where scientific uncertainty is involved. Gelpe &






In National Lime Association v. EPA, 126 the D.C. Circuit had an oppor-
tunity to consider the extent to which technological feasibility may limit
agency discretion in setting protective standards. In March 1978, pursuant
to section 111 of the Clean Air Act, 127 the EPA promulgated final stan-
dards limiting the amount of lime dust in air resulting from the pulverizing
of limestone. 128 Section 111 authorizes the EPA to issue new source per-
formance standards (NSPS) designed to limit air pollutants that may be
emitted from newly constructed or modified emissions sources. In setting
NSPS, the EPA must determine that they reflect the degree of limitation
achievable through application of "the best technological system of contin-
uous emission reduction . . . which has been adequately demon-
strated . .. ,,129 The agency had tested several plants in an effort to
determine NSPS based on the best technology available. 3 ° The issue
before the court was whether the test data underlying the EPA's newly
promulgated standard supported adequately the conclusion that the pro-
scribed emission levels were in fact achievable on a repetitive basis.' 3 '
The National Lime court held that the EPA had failed to consider ade-
quately whether its test plants were representative of the industry as a
whole, particularly in light of the many variations, such as size and age of
feedstock, that would be encountered nationwide. 3 2 The court estab-
lished a two-pronged test for determining achievability of a NSPS. First,
the agency must identify specific variable conditions that might contribute
significantly to the amount of emissions produced.'33 Second, the agency
must develop methods of testing that, given the range of variables identi-
fied, provide some degree of assurance of achievability of the standard for
the industry as a whole.' The EPA failed to show that the standard to
125. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 55.
126. 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
127. During the course of the EPA's rulemaking proceeding in this case, Congress
amended § I I I of the Clean Air Act in enacting the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1982)). The Na-
tional Lime court held the EPA subject to the requirements of the amended version of § I 1i.
National Lime, 627 F.2d at 429.
128. 43 Fed. Reg. 9452 (1978).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1982).
130. National Lime, 627 F.2d at 435.
131. Id. at 430.
132. Id. at 432-33.
133. Id. at 433.
134. Id.
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be imposed was achievable by the industry as a whole.
The D.C. Circuit has also shown that consideration of the issue of tech-
nological feasibility may actually be a way of addressing economic feasi-
bility. In Sierra Club v. Costle,'3 5 for example, the issue of technological
feasibility involved economic as well as technological considerations. Si-
erra Club arose when Congress, in 1977, amended section 11 l(a)(1) of the
Clean Air Act to provide special regulatory treatment for electric power
plants. 136 Prior to the amendments, the EPA had promulgated NSPS for
coal-fired electric power plants that specified a ceiling for sulfur dioxide
emissions. 137 Operators of coal-fired power plants found they could meet
this standard by burning low-sulfur coal,'38 and thereby could avoid in-
stalling new technology that was both costly and required continuous su-
pervision. As amended, section 111 required the EPA to establish NSPS
that achieved percentage reductions in emissions lower than the emissions
that would have resulted from the use of low-sulfur coal alone. 139 The
135. 567 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). A number of articles discussing the issues in Sierra
Club were published during litigation. These articles indicated the growing importance of
the issue of energy costs and the impact of the economy on environmental regulation. See
id at 313 n.8 for a list of articles. See infra note 249 for an estimate of the economic cost of
the proposed standards at issue in Sierra Club.
136. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 109(c)(1)(A), 91 Stat. 685,
699-700 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(a)(1)(A) (1982)). Among other
things, Congress was concerned that the National Ambient Air Quality Standards System of
air pollution regulation would constrain long-term economic growth. For example, the ca-
pacity for an area to accept new emissions sources would be limited, or costly retrofitting of
already constructed plants would be required, as ambient air quality standards were reached
in that area. To ease this burden, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to require new
emitting sources to meet NSPS that reflect the best system of technology adequately demon-
strated. Thus, the cost of emission control would be faced by utilities at one time, as each
new plant was built, and the minimal pollution allowed by the stringent new standards
would, in the long term, maximize potential growth. See H.R. REP. No. 1175, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 158, 161 (1976), reprinted in THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIVISION, CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 A LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977, at 6706-08 (1977).
137. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 315. The original standards, promulgated in 1971, limited
sulfur dioxide emissions to 1.2 pounds of sulfur dioxide per million British thermal units (1.2
lbs/MBtu). 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (1971).
138. Low-sulfur coal is primarily available from the western states of Wyoming and
Montana, and from West Virginia. See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF ENERGY, PUB. No. DOE/EIA-0407, IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSED CLEAN AIR ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1982 ON THE COAL AND ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRIES 31 (1983). Coal
from the eastern United States, because it is high in sulfur, required pretreatment (washing
techniques) or the use of costly flue gas desulfurization equipment by coal-fired power
plants, even under the 1971 performance standards. Id at 15.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(l)(A)(ii) (1982). The actual language of § 111 requires reduc-
tion below the emission levels that "would have resulted from the use of fuels which are not
subject to treatment prior to combustion .... " Id Congress intended to prevent industry
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amendments required these percentage reductions in addition to an emis-
sion ceiling. The major technology available as an alternative to burning
low-sulfur coal was flue gas desulfurization (FGD), an expensive process
that removes sulfur from exhaust emissions by adding alkaline materials to
the exhaust stream.14°
The EPA responded to the statutory amendments by issuing revised
NSPS in June 1979 that imposed strict pollution controls on coal-fired
electric power plants.' 4 ' The revised NSPS, however, adopted a sliding-
scale approach, requiring removal of seventy to ninety percent sulfur diox-
ide from plant emissions, depending upon the sulfur content of the coal
used.' 42 Under this regulatory scheme, power plants could meet the stan-
dards either by burning low-sulfur coal while using potentially less costly
(dry scrubber) flue gas desulfurization, or by using standard (wet scrubber)
flue gas desulfurization alone. Environmental groups challenged the regu-
lation, contending that the required reduction level was impermissible
since it did not reduce emissions to the greatest extent feasible. 43 Specifi-
cally, Sierra Club alleged that in requiring the use of the best technological
system of reduction available, section 111 of the Act required a uniform
national percentage reduction standard, 44 and thus the variable standard
was an abuse of the agency's discretion.
45
The D.C. Circuit rejected Sierra Club's argument that use of a variable
standard conflicted with the statute. The court looked first to the language
of section 111 and held that it contains no express mandate to promulgate
a uniform standard.'4 6 Moreover, the Sierra Club court found that the
legislative history 14 7 clearly contemplated the adoption of a regulatory
from by-passing the use of desulfurization technology by using low-sulfur coal. H.R. REP.
No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 510 (1977) (performance standards should be upgraded to
preclude use of untreated low sulfur coal as a means of compliance).
140. Flue gas desulfurization consists primarily of the injection, into coal-fired power
plant exhaust streams, of a liquefied or dry stream of alkaline material, such as lime, to
neutralize the sulfur oxides escaping. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 323-25. The use of dry
streams of desulfurizing material is referred to as dry-scrubbing. This technique of desulfur-
ization was new and, in the court's view, was encouraged under § 111 (j) of the Clean Air
Act. This provision allows a waiver from the application of NSPS for technologies that are
unproved but which may ultimately meet the NSPS. Id at 324, 346-47. See also infra note
149 and accompanying text.
141. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,580 (1979).
142. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 316.
143. Id at 316-17.
144. Id
145. Id.
146. Id at 318.
147. 123 CONG. REC. 26,846 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Muskie) ("EPA's Administrator is
given the flexibility to set a range of pollutant removal based on varying fuel characteristics"
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scheme that would permit a range of emission levels to reflect varying fuel
characteristics.1 48 The court also reasoned that the variable standard en-
couraged the use of innovative new technology, and that section
111 (j)(1)(A) of the Act authorized a variance from meeting the stringent
standards of section 111 (a)(1) when new technology was to be used and
substantial compliance could be demonstrated. 49 Thus, the Sierra Club
court specifically upheld the use of a dual standard even where a more
stringent standard was technologically feasible. In doing so, the D.C. Cir-
cuit suggested that dual standards may be used when applicable legislation
indicates a willingness to accept a dual standard and economic considera-
tions argue in favor of such a standard.
3. Economic Feasibility
In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle,"5° the D.C. Circuit specifically considered
the issue of economic feasibility as one factor that must be addressed in
determining the validity of final water pollution control standards. The
standards at issue in Weyerhaeuser were promulgated pursuant to sections
301(b)(1)(A) and 304(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
of 1972 (FWPCA). 5 ' These statutory provisions directed the EPA to de-
velop, by 1977, nationally uniform regulations for various categories of
industrial effluent dischargers. Essentially, section 301(b)(1)(A) of the
FWPCA required the EPA to develop national standards for discharging
industries based on what was called the best practicable control technology
currently available (BPCTCA). 5 2 Section 304(b)(1)(B) described what
factors must be considered in determining BPCTCA. 5 3 One factor in-
volved a comparison between the cost of application of the technology
if NSPS will not be undermined.). See Clean Air Act Conference Report.- Statement of In-
tent; ClarKcation of Select Provisions, 123 CONG. REC. 27,071 (1977). The conference report
clearly indicates that the Administrator may set the reduction required by NSPS under the
amendments as a range, but this range is allowed only to reflect varying fuel characteristics.
148. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 321.
149. Id at 346-47. The standard's 70% reduction option would ensure compliance where
dry scrubber technology was employed and would encourage further development of this
new, potentially lower-cost technology. Id. at 347-51.
150. 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
151. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 815, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), 1314(b) (1982).
152. 33 U.S.C. §§ 131 l(b)(1)(A), 1314(b) (1982).
153. Section 304(b)(i)(B) states, in part:
Factors relating to the assessment of best practicable control technology currently
available. . . shall include consideration of the total cost of application of technol-
ogy in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such applica-
tion, and shall also take into account the age of equipment and facilities involved,
the engineering aspects of the application of various types of control techniques,
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chosen and the effluent reduction benefits that could be achieved from
such application.
The EPA developed national standards for waste discharge by various
subcategories of paper manufacturers. 54 In doing so, the EPA considered,
among other factors, the cost of compliance with the standard by each sub-
category as a whole and the total cost of compliance with the various sub-
category standards by the industry as a whole.' 55 The agency found that
both the industry as a whole and each subcategory could absorb the costs
of the standard, and that the costs were reasonably counterbalanced by the
effluent reduction benefits.1 56 Essentially, the EPA used economic analysis
that ensured the achievability of the standard chosen, but did not maxi-
mize the benefits achieved per unit of Cost. 157 Several paper mill compa-
nies challenged the limitations, alleging that the EPA was required to
consider the costs and benefits of waste treatment control, not by balancing
costs of the standard against the industry, or subcategory, as a whole, but
by analyzing whether the benefit gained from each additional level of re-
duction was worth the cost required to achieve that level of reduction.' 58
The companies maintained that in conducting such cost comparison, the
EPA could avoid requiring an additional degree of effluent reduction that
was wholly out of proportion with the costs of achieving that reduction., 59
process changes, non-water quality environmental impact (including energy re-
quirements), and such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate ....
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1982).
The court held that this section should be read to require two separate analyses. The first
analysis required by the section is a balancing of the standard's costs to the industry as a
whole versus effluent reduction benefits achieved. Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1045-46. The
second analytic requirement applied to the "take into account" language of § 304(b). The
court held that this language meant that the agency must consider the factors listed (e.g.,
nonwater quality environmental impact, energy requirements, etc.) without giving each fac-
tor a specific weight. The refinery had argued that the agency must balance, in a cost-benefit
manner, such things as non-water quality environmental impact versus the gains to be
achieved through use of the new standards. Id at 1046, 1050.
154. Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1047.
155. Id.
156. Id The EPA found that the industry as a whole would readily absorb the estimated
$1.6 billion cost of compliance with the standard. Out of 270 affected mills employing
120,000 people, 8 were expected to close and 1800 people were expected to be laid off. The
greatest impact would fall on one subcategory consisting of fewer than 30 mills. Three of
these mills were expected to close as a result of the standard, with 550 jobs lost. Id.
The overall benefits of the standard were estimated at 5,000 fewer tons of the pollutant
category per day. Id The EPA also calculated the cost per pound of pollutant removed for
each subcategory of the industry, and found the balance to be favorable. Id
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. The paper companies cited legislative history of the Act stating that the balanc-
ing test between the effluent reduction benefits and the total cost of the technology imposed
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The Weyerhaeuser court upheld the EPA's approach, declining to im-
pose a requirement of incremental cost-benefit analysis. In the court's
view, the cost of compliance was not a factor to be given primary impor-
tance. 60 It reasoned that a requirement that the EPA perform an elabo-
rate task of incrementally balancing costs versus benefits would bog the
agency down in burdensome proceedings on a relatively subsidiary task.16'
Thus, the court concluded that, even when a statute specifically requires
some consideration of costs versus benefits, the agency fulfills its obligation
by performing a fairly simplistic analysis that balances costs to the indus-
try (or subcategory) as a whole versus benefits. 162 The basic goal of this
type of analysis is to determine whether the industry, or subcategory, can
achieve the standard imposed without experiencing complete financial dis-
aster. This type of cost-benefit balancing, however, unlike incremental
cost-benefit analysis, does not maximize the benefits achieved per amount
of dollars invested. 1
63
was intended to limit the application of technology where the additional degree of protec-
tion provided was wholly out of proportion with the costs of achieving that level of protec-
tion. Id at 1045 n.52, 1047.
160. Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1048. The court relied on American Iron and Steel Inst.
v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975), af'd in part & rev'd in part sub nom. DuPont v. Train,
430 U.S. 112 (1977), to support this interpretation of the Act. American Iron discussed Con-
gress' commitment to the goal of controlling water pollution through the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act and stated that "the cost of compliance was not a factor to be given
primary importance." Id at 1051. Congress realized that achievement of the Act's goals
would force industries to develop water control technology not yet in existence, and would
probably result in the closing of some of the nation's plants. Id. at 1050.
161. Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1048. The court upheld the EPA's economic analysis of
the standard despite the fact that, during the rulemaking comment period, industry com-
menters had submitted to the agency an incremental breakdown of the costs and benefits of
various standards. Thus, contrary to the court's statement about the EPA having to perform
an elaborate analysis, the agency could have used the industry's cost-benefit analysis to ar-
rive at a suitable standard. The industry's analysis, however, actually supported the EPA's
decision. 1d at 1047-48. While the court indicated the possibility of remanding to the EPA
if the industry's analysis had disclosed a "hidden imbalance"-a cost not in proportion with
the benefit gained from the additional increment of discharge reduction achieved-the court
clearly indicated that the EPA was not required to perform incremental cost-benefit balanc-
ing on its own initiative. Id. at 1048 (quoting American Iron, 526 F.2d at 1076 n. 19).
162. Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1048. The court stated specifically that the EPA need not
perform more than net cost-benefit balancing to meet its obligations under § 304. Id




II. SMALL REFINERS LEAD PHA4sE-DOWN TASK FORCE v EPA." AN
IDEAL CASE FOR APPLICATION OF THE CURRENT MODEL FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY
AND HEALTH RULEMAKINGS
A. Elements of the Model
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1970 and Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 require
the implementing agencies to set standards that protect health or natural
resources despite what may be heavy economic burdens on affected indus-
tries. 164 Each act is designed to provide the most protection possible, with-
out requiring the agency to evaluate extensively the degree to which health
benefits outweigh the economic impacts of the standards chosen, 65
Rather, Congress has already balanced the costs of regulation versus the
health or environmental advances to be achieved under each act.' 66 The
acts represent a public policy that favors protection of human health and
the environment over unrestricted economic growth. 167 They do not, how-
ever, represent a policy that favors providing absolute safety for human
health or the environment at any cost.'
68
164. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
165. Courts interpreting these statutes have consistently held that cost-benefit analysis,
for example, is not necessary under the provisions of these statutes unless such provisions
specifically require cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 510-12; Small
Refiners, 705 F.2d at 526 n.42; Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1048 (even where cost-benefit
balancing is required, minimal net-balancing will fulfill the requirement).
166. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 32,905 (1970) (the costs imposed by the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970 represent a policy decision that only Congress has the right to make)
(remarks of Sen. Muskie); Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 509 (Congress itself defined the relation-
ship between costs and benefits); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1052
(3d. Cir. 1975) (some economic disruption was anticipated by Congress as the price to pay
for efforts under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and the EPA, therefore, is given
wide discretion in implementing standards).
167. This policy was best summarized by Sen. Muskie during floor debates on the Clean
Air Amendments of 1970: The "old philosophy, that when you see the smoke rolling out of
the tops of the blast furnaces there is prosperity, doesn't go anymore . . . . Prosperity
doesn't mean anything if they are not going to live to enjoy the prosperity." 116 CONG. REC.
32,901 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie, quoting hearing witness). See also Sagoff, supra note
14.
168. 116 CONG. REC. 32,905 (1970) (under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, certain
costs, such as requiring automobile manufacturers to stop producing cars altogether if they
cannot meet prospective standards by a certain date, might be too great) (remarks of Sen.
Muskie); 116 CONG. REC. 37,614, 37,621-23 (1970) (OSH Act § 6(b)(5) should not be inter-
preted to require absolute health and safety in all cases) (remarks of Sen. Dominick). The
fact that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, with its stated goal of zero discharge, or
absolute protection, allows variances in appropriate cases under § 404 of the Act, indicates
that absolute safety is primarily an ideal rather than an assured end point.
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In light of the similarities among these legislative directives, the D.C.
Circuit has developed a common model for judicial review of agency regu-
lation under these acts. This model addresses the minimum requirements
an agency must meet to justify the standards it imposes. While its general
elements may be modified to the extent that specific provisions of environ-
mental or health statutes require,169 these elements include showing that a
significant risk of harm exists; that the standard imposed alleviates the risk;
that the standard is technologically achievable by the industry; and that
the economic impact of the standard on the industry as a whole is accepta-
ble. This model was applied correctly in Small Refiners Lead Phase-Down
Task Force v. EPA.
B. Application of the Model
In Small Refiners Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 17 ° the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the
limits of the EPA's discretion, pursuant to sections 211(c)(1)(A) '7 and
21 l(g)(2)'1 2 of the Clean Air Act, to regulate the amount of lead in gaso-
line produced by small refiners. In examining the agency's final decision,
the court considered the four elements of the model that has evolved in the
D.C. Circuit for review of environmental actions,173 and framed its hold-
ing accordingly. It concluded that the EPA had sufficiently justified the
standards it imposed on small refiners by showing that lead from gasoline
presents a significant risk to human health, especially in young children; 
74
that reducing the amount of lead added to gasoline produced by small
refiners reduces the threat to human health; 75 that small refiners could
achieve the new standard through inter-refinery transactions; 176 and that
the economic impact of the standard imposed on the industry as a whole
169. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d at 347, where the court held that
§ 11 I(j)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act, which encouraged the use of new technology, modified
§ Il l(a)(1), which required the use of the best available technological system of air pollution
reduction.
170. 705 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
171. Section 21 l(c)(l)(A) of the Clean Air Act states, in pertinent part, that the Adminis-
trator of the EPA may control or prohibit any fuel additive if the additive "causes, or con-
tributes, to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health
or welfare .... 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(I)(A) (1982). See supra notes 22, 112 and accompany-
ing text.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(g)(2) (1982). See infra note 180.
173. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
174. SmallRefiners, 705 F.2d at 529, 531.
175. Id at 527-28.





The Small Refiners court first reviewed the EPA's statutory authority to
promulgate the standard in question. It found that section 211 (g)(2) of the
Act, which had been added as part of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments,' 78 granted the EPA broad authority to regulate small refiners.1
7
1
The statute provided that until October 1, 1982, small refiners were to be
treated on a sliding-scale basis so that the smaller the refinery, the more
lead it could use per gallon of gasoline it produced.' 8 After that date, the
EPA could regulate small refiners in whatever manner the Administrator
deemed appropriate, so long as experience gained under the sliding-scale
regulations was considered.' The court held that section 211 (g)(2) re-
quired only that the EPA consider in good faith its experience with sliding-
scale regulation in determining a final standard. 
82
After examining the EPA's statutory authority to promulgate the stan-
dard, the court examined the record that the agency relied on to support
the specific standard it imposed. Although small refiners are located pri-
marily in rural areas, evidence in the record indicated that some small
177. Id.
178. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 223, 91 Stat. 685, 764 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(g) (1982)).
179. SmallRefners, 705 F.2d at 515.
180. Section 211(g)(2) of the Clean Air Act established that small refiners were to be
regulated as follows until October 1, 1982:
If the average gasoline pro-
duction of the small refin-
ery for the immediately
preceding calendar year
.. . was (in barrels per The applicable amount [of lead] is (in
day): grams per gallon):
5,000 or under ......... . ................... 2.65
5,001 to 10,000 ......... ................... 2.15
10,001 to 15,000 ........ ................... 1.65
15,001 to 20,000 ......................... 1.30
20,001 to 25,000 ........ ................... 0.80
25,001 or over ......... ..... As prescribed by the Administrator,
but not greater than 0.80
181. Small Refiners, 705 F.2d at 515. Section 211 (g)(2) states that the "Administrator
may promulgate such regulations as he deems appropriate with respect to the reduction of
the average lead content of gasoline refined by small refineries on and after October 1, 1982,
taking into account the experience under the [sliding-scale]." 42 U.S.C. § 7545(g)(2) (1982).
182. SmallRefiners, 705 F.2d at 516. The Small Refiners interpretation of this section is
consistent with Weyerhaeuser's treatment of the "take into account" language in § 304(b) of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. Thus,
the phrase "take into account" seems to require good faith consideration without special
weight given to any specific factor, including economic considerations, and without exact
balancing among listed factors.
1984] 1057
Catholic University Law Review
refiners made sales of leaded gasoline to urban centers. 8 3 It also indicated
that the blood lead levels of children in both rural and urban areas were
affected by small refiner lead use,' 8 4 and that these levels were detrimental
to health. The Small Refiners court specifically noted that studies in the
agency's record had shown a significant risk of adverse health effects from
blood lead levels as low as 10-15 micrograms per deciliter. 8 5 The court
also noted that an EPA consultant had estimated that the 1.10 gplg/2.50
gplg dual standard proposed by SRTF would produce a mean blood lead
level of 7.7 micrograms per deciliter for whites and 10.1 micrograms per
deciliter for blacks by 1990.86 The court held, therefore, that the EPA's
record adequately supported the agency's conclusion that small refiners'
lead use posed a significant risk to the health of individuals in both urban
and rural environments 87 and that reduction of blood lead levels below
the level that would be produced by the proposed dual standard was neces-
sary to ensure adequate protection against adverse health effects.'
88
The court next examined several studies in the record that showed
strong correlation between gasoline lead use and blood lead levels. These
studies demonstrated that a positive linear relationship exists between lead
levels in gasoline and blood lead levels.' 8 9 They showed that as lead had
183. Id. at 532-33.
184. Id at 529, 533.
185. Id at 53 1. The Small Refiners court can be criticized, perhaps, for the active role it
played in interpreting the agency's rulemaking record to find a significant health risk at 10
micrograms per deciliter. The EPA never clearly stated that a "significant risk" to health
existed from exposures to lead that resulted in blood lead levels as low as 10 micrograms per
deciliter. Rather, the EPA stated that the studies of health effects at blood lead levels as low
as 10 mirograms per deciliter were "suggestive of a potentially lower maximum safe level of
blood lead" than the 30 micrograms per deciliter considered potentially dangerous by the
federal Centers for Disease Control and that "reasonable steps to control lead emissions"
should be taken. 47 Fed. Reg. 38,077 (1982) (emphasis added). It could be argued that this
aspect of the Small Refiners decision violated a general principle of administrative law that a
"court is not to make its own findings." See Leventhal, supra note 16, at 511; cf. Roders,
Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision Theory in Unscrambling the Ben-
zene Decision, II ENVT'L L. 301, 302 (1981) (the suspicion arises that the willingness of a
court to uphold an agency's decision depends exclusively on whether the judge agrees with
the result). On the other hand, participants in the administrative process have recognized
that agencies and courts constitute "a partnership in furtherance of the public interest" and
that the "court is in a real sense part of the total administrative process, and not a hostile
stranger." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
186. Small Refiners, 705 F.2d at 531.
187. Id at 529, 531, 533.
188. Id at 531.
189. Id at 527-30. A study by the Centers for Disease Control showed that as gasoline
lead use declined between 1976 and 1980, mean blood lead levels declined in virtual lock-
step. Id at 527. Thus, a positive correlation existed between lead content in gasoline and
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been removed from gasoline over the preceding several years, blood lead
levels correspondingly had been reduced. 9° The court found that this
portion of the record sufficiently demonstrated that reduced lead use by
small refiners would lower blood lead levels and thus reduce health
risks.
The court also examined the EPA's evidence regarding the technological
ability of small refiners to meet the standard. The EPA primarily based its
feasibility analysis on a model that treated all small refineries as though
they were a single small refinery, with characteristics equal to a weighted
average of all small refineries.' 92 On this basis, the EPA concluded that
small refiners, in aggregate, had the capacity to meet the proposed stan-
dard without reducing the octane rating of gasoline they produced.' 93 The
agency also concluded that, through the use of inter-refinery trading of
lead credits, those refiners that needed to exceed the new standard to pro-
duce high-octane gasoline could purchase lead "credits" from those refin-
ers that produced high-octane gasoline without using lead. 94 The court
held that use of the model, in combination with the inter-refinery trading
of lead credits, was a reasonable approach to determining the capability of
small refiners to meet the standard.
95
Finally, the court examined the economic impact of the standard. The
court noted that section 21 l(c)(2)(A) of the Clean Air Act, which requires
the EPA to consider alternative means of achieving emissions control
before regulating lead pursuant to section 21 l(c)(1)(A) of the Act, does not
specifically impose a requirement of cost-benefit analysis. It further stated,
however, that review of standards promulgated under section 211 (c)(2)(A)
need not be restricted to a consideration of health benefits alone.' 96 In the
court's view, four pieces of evidence compelled examination of economic
impact. First, nothing in section 211 (c)(2)(A) specifically restricts EPA's
consideration of relevant factors, including economic factors.' 97 Second,
since a related section of the Act specifically requires cost-benefit analysis
blood lead levels. See infra note 216 and accompanying text for a discussion of dose-re-
sponse curves.
190. Small Refiners, 705 F.2d at 527.
191. Id at 531, 533.
192. Id. at 535.
193. Id at 534-36.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 536.
196. Id. at 526 n.42. The court also stated that since economic considerations formed a
major part of the EPA's rulemaking record and analysis, the court was required to review
the EPA's economic reasoning to determine if the final standard was reasonable. Id. at 526.
197. Id at 526 n.42.
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before additives can be regulated to prevent impairment of emission con-
trol devices, it is unlikely that Congress would at the same time forbid the
EPA from considering economic costs under section 211 (c)(2)(A).
198
Third, the legislative history of section 211 indicates that before controlling
or prohibiting the use of fuel additives, the EPA is required to consider
technical and cost factors. 199 Fourth, Congress took economic feasibility
into account when it enacted section 211(g), granting small refiners the
special relief of a sliding scale system of regulation.2"' Thus, the court
held that the EPA properly included consideration of economic impact of
the standard in its rulemaking decision.20'
The only issue remaining was whether the EPA had sufficiently justified,
in terms of economic impact, the level of reduction chosen or whether the
agency should have considered more carefully the economic advantages of
alternative standards.20 2 In essence, the court was required to decide
whether or not incremental cost-benefit analysis, although not mandated
specifically by statute, was necessary to support the final standard chosen
by the EPA. The court upheld the validity of the final standard chosen
indicating that, once EPA had shown reduction of a significant risk to
health, the agency need only balance expected health benefits against the
cost to the industry as a whole.
20 3
1. The D. C. Circuit's Treatment of Significant Risk
As compared with the view expressed in Ethyl Corp., Small Refiners re-
flects a more restrictive view of EPA's discretion to implement a toxic sub-
stance control standard. This restrictive view, however, is appropriate in
light of the facts of Small Refners. In circumstances where factual uncer-




201. Id. at 526.
202. Id. See also Brief for Petitioner at 46, Small Refiners, 705 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
SRTF argued that, under the uniform standard imposed by the EPA, projected annual lead
emissions would be reduced 74% during the years 1983 through 1990 as compared to 68% if
small refiners were allowed to comply with a separate 2.50 gplg standard. According to
SRTF, the EPA had not shown that the added economic burden imposed by the uniform
standard was warranted by the lead emission reduction achieved. Id. at 46-47.
In promulgating the uniform lead standard, the EPA had complied with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 603-604 by preparing the required Regulatory Flexibility Analy-
ses. The final Regulatory Flexability Analysis document described the final standard chosen
and four alternatives that were ultimately rejected. Small Refiners, 705 F.2d at 537-40.
While this was sufficient to meet the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, it was
not a cost-benefit comparison of the possible choices.
203. Id. at 536.
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Ethyl Corp., a specific showing of actual harm should not be required to
justify regulation. Where, on the other hand, adequate scientific evidence
is available to assess the harmful impact of a toxic substance, a more defi-
nite showing of significant risk should be made.
In Small Refiners, for example, studies in the EPA's record demonstrated
the effects of lead on human health at various exposure levels.2" Other
studies showed the effect that removing lead from gasoline had on blood
lead levels and indicated that removal of lead correlated well with reduc-
tion of blood lead levels.2" 5 The court indicated that to justify regulation
under these circumstances, the EPA must be able to quantify the level of
exposure to lead that results in a significant risk to human health.20 6
Moreover, the agency must show that its proposed regulation will reduce
the risk of health impairment.20 7
In Ethyl Corp., however, the D.C. Circuit upheld the use of a regulatory
threshold test that required the EPA to show only a serious threat of harm
from leaded gasoline. The agency was required to prove factually neither
that lead in gasoline caused disease at a specific level, nor that removal of
lead from gasoline would reduce the risk to health. 2 8 To a large extent,
this was because a great deal of uncertainty surrounded the state of knowl-
edge at that time regarding the health effects of lead.209 Since the uncer-
tainty of the available evidence was great, the court focused on the risk of
harm that continued use of lead could cause.210 Because the court was
convinced that the potential harm from continued use of leaded gasoline
was great, and, in fact, outweighed the benefits of continued unrestricted
use of lead, it was willing to uphold the regulations despite the EPA's less
than definite showing that the regulation would reduce actual harm.
The method of analysis used in Ethyl Corp. is essentially risk-benefit
analysis.2 1 Under such analysis, the risks of uncertain harm are treated as
the cost of continued use of a toxic substance. When these costs are
204. Id. at 527-30.
205. Id
206. Id at 525, 531. The court stated that judicial deference to the EPA did not relieve
the agency of its duty to explain why its final standard is an appropriate one; and a simple-
minded argument that gasoline lead is bad and the EPA's standard reduces lead was not
enough to satisfy the agency's duty. Id at 525. While the court did not demand certainty, it
expected the agency's choice of numerical standard to be within a zone of reasonableness.
Id
207. Id at 527-31 (the EPA's decision to reduce lead was supported by clear evidence
that further reduction in lead usage would result in reduced health impairment).
208. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 24, 28.
209. Id
210. Id
211. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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weighed against the benefits derived from continued use of the substance,
a judgment as to whether or not to regulate can be made. If, for example,
the risk of harm from continued use of a toxic substance is great and the
benefits of continued use are low or moderate, use of the substance should
be restricted. If, on the other hand, the risk of harm is moderate or remote,
but the benefits of continued use are high, continued use probably should
be allowed.212 In circumstances where factual uncertainty regarding the
health effects of a substance is great, the threshold or significant risk test
should be characterized more by risk-benefit analysis than by factual proof
of harm.
Another area in which risk-benefit analysis is appropriate is the regula-
tion of carcinogenic substances. Since the actual disease mechanism of
cancer is unknown, it is difficult to quantify the level at which exposure to
a known cancer-causing substance will result in disease. Some medical
evidence suggests that a single exposure to carcinogenic substances may be
capable of triggering events that ultimately lead to cancer.213 Any test re-
quiring an empirical threshold showing that a toxic substance poses a sig-
nificant risk of harm at a given level of exposure may preclude reasonable
regulation of carcinogens, since a triggering event caused by a low, and
unmeasurable,214 level of exposure may ultimately result in cancer.
Detectability is further complicated by the fact that a cancer may develop
fully only twenty or more years after exposure has occurred. 215 The model
212. See Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc), in which the Eighth
Circuit, upon balancing a remote risk of cancer against the benefits of continued mining
discharges, imposed a liberal compliance schedule on the discharging source.
213. See Maugh, Chemical Carcinogens: How Dangerous are Low Doses, 202 Sc1. 37
(1978). The author explains that extensive evidence from radiation-induced cancer shows a
linear dose-response curve that decreases, as exposure decreases, almost to zero dose.
Extrapolating from this evidence to chemical carcinogens, some medical theorists hypothe-
size that a single molecule of carcinogen can trigger cancer by interacting with a single
cellular receptor. Other scientists, however, argue that the radiation-induced cancer evi-
dence cannot be extended to chemical carcinogens since cellular mechanisms can prevent
reaction between the chemical carcinogen (but not radiation) and critical areas of the cell
(particularly the DNA-containing nucleus of the cell). These scientists theorize a level of
chemical exposure exists below which cancer cannot be caused. See also McGarity, Sub-
stantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions:
Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 734 n.26 (1979); supra note 59
and accompanying text (discussing cancer mechanisms).
214. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
215. See Note, Establishing Causation in Chemical Exposure Cases: The Precursor Symp-
toms Theory, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 163, 169 (1982) (30 year latency period for development
of health problems from exposure of shipyard workers to asbestos); Selikoff, Occupational
Lung Disease, in ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN RESPIRATORY DISEASE, ch. 13, at 199, 208
(D. Lee ed. 1972) (lapse of 40 years may occur before appearance of lung cancer caused by
occupational exposure); Dubos, Adaptation to the Environment and Man's Future, THE CON-
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for setting toxic substance standards that requires demonstrating linear
dose-response curves, 216 such as can be demonstrated currently for expo-
sure to lead or cotton dust, is inappropriate when a substance is known to
have certain toxic effects, but medical evidence is unavailable to show
cause and effect. In such circumstances, only the risk of harm can be
shown, and thus regulatory efforts should focus on the risk involved.
2. Benzene and Significant Risk
Benzene, for example, involved efforts to regulate a known carcinogenic
substance. The Benzene Court appeared to advocate risk-benefit analysis
in such circumstances, presumably because evidence of health effects was
uncertain or unavailable.217 The Court stated, for example, that OSHA
was not required to support its findings with scientific certainty. 218 If the
probability were one in a thousand that regular inhalation of gasoline va-
pors containing benzene would be fatal, the risk is significant, and regula-
tions to reduce or eliminate the risk are appropriate. 219 This effort to
assess and balance risk against the benefits of continued use is consistent
with Ethyl Corp. The actual holding of Benzene, however, appeared to
require the type of certainty of harm that was available in Small Refiners.
While Small Refiners was an appropriate case to require certainty ap-
proaching the level of cause and effect, Benzene was not.
The principal holding of Benzene required OSHA to make a threshold
showing that a significant risk of harm was present and that the risk could
be eliminated or reduced by a change in practices.22 ° If the Court, by this
TROL OF THE ENVIRONMENT, A DISCUSSION AT THE NOBEL CONFERENCE 59, 64 (J. Roslan-
sky ed. 1967) (nonlethal radiation levels may cause harm that is not manifested for 20 or
more years). See supra note 15 for a discussion of government liability for exposing workers
to federally permissible radiation levels.
216. See American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.d at 504 n.24, explaining that a dose-
response curve shows the relationship between different exposure levels and the risk of harm
associated with those exposure levels. For toxic substances in general, exposure to higher
levels of the substance results in greater risk of harm than exposure to lower levels of the
substance. See also McGarity, supra note 213, at 736-35 n.27.
217. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 655. The Court gave an example of risk-benefit analysis when
it stated that the risk is not significant if the risk of fatality following exposure to a substance
is only one in a billion. The Court implied that such a risk is "plainly acceptable." Id. The
Court further suggested, in this part of the opinion, that it advocates the use of this type of
analysis when an agency faces scientific uncertainty, explaining that the requirement that a
significant risk be identified prior to regulation is not intended as a "mathematical strait-
jacket." Id
218. Id at 656.
219. Id at 655.
220. Id at 639-40. The Court clearly focused on the proposed standard's ability to re-
duce risk. For example, the Court stated that the OSH Act requires OSHA to promulgate
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statement, was requiring a definite or quantifiable showing that the regula-
tion would reduce or eliminate the risk involved, then it was imposing a
test that approximated showing cause and effect.221 While it may be rea-
sonable to require statistical quantification of the risk posed by a toxic
substance as a precondition to regulating the substance, it is not necessarily
reasonable to require quantification of the probability that the proposed
measure will succeed in reducing the harm.222
standards that are reasonably necessary and appropriate to "remedy" a significant risk. Id
The Court also stated that the OSH Act was intended to require "elimination" of significant
risks. Id. at 641. A threshold test that includes the requirement to show the likelihood of
alleviating harm is similar to the cause-and-effect test advocated in the Ethyl Corp. dissent-
ing opinion. The dissent in that case argued that only after the EPA had shown that lead in
gasoline caused a significant health hazard could the EPA claim "that controlling or prohib-
iting lead would reduce significantly such health hazard." Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 95
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). See also Hadley & Richman, The Im-
pact of Benzene and Cotton Dust: Restraint on the Regulation of Toxic Substances, 34 AD. L.
REV. 59, 64 (1982) (Benzene accepted for the proposition that OSHA must make a finding of
significant risk and of likelihood of alleviation of risk).
OSHA, in response to the Benzene and Cotton Dust cases, adopted a four-step process for
setting standards. The significant risk test under this process includes the requirement of
showing that compliance with the proposed standard will reduce the risk of the hazard. See
OSHA to Use Four-Step in Setting Standards, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, July 20,
1981, at 7.
221. The Benzene Court stated specifically that § 3(8) of the OSH Act requires that the
risk from a toxic substance be "quantified sufficiently" before it can be characterized as
significant. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 655. It is logical to infer that, in the Benzene Court's view,
an agency also must quantify sufficiently the proposed standard's ability to alleviate the risk
of harm. Thus, when it promulgated standards to regulate exposure to cotton dust, OSHA,
in reliance on Benzene, stated that the prevalence of harm caused by exposure to cotton dust
was likely to be reduced by the proposed standards. Cotton Dust, 490 U.S. at 506 n.25.
OSHA carefully quantified the risk reduction to be obtained from the proposed standard by
relying on the strong linear relationship between the incidence of harmful effects and the
ambient concentration of respirable cotton dust particles. Id at 503. The Cotton Dust deci-
sion, by stating that it was "difficult to imagine what else the agency could do to comply with
. . . [the] Court's decision in [Benzene]," implied that using this type of evidence was the
ideal, if not the only, way to meet the Benzene threshold test. Cotton Dust, 490 U.S. at 503
n.25. By requiring a quantifiable showing that a standard reduces risk, the Benzene opinion
essentially required the type of linear dose-response correlation available in Cotton Dust and
Small Refners, but unavailable for any carcinogen given the current state of knowledge.
222. In the case of multiple sources of exposure to a single substance, for example, it may
be possible to quantify the level of harm caused by a given level of exposure to the sub-
stance, but not be possible to ensure that reducing the exposure attributed to one of many
sources will reduce the risk of harm. Thus, in Ethyl Corp., even though the EPA had some
evidence that exposure to a certain level of lead would cause harm, the agency could not
prove that lead in gasoline, as opposed to ingested lead from lead-based paint, caused harm.
Ethyl Corp., 541 U.S. at 29-30.
The Small Refiners court appeared to ignore this aspect of the Benzene threshold test when
it said that the significant health risk from low blood lead levels would "justify EPA in
banning lead from gasoline entirely." Small Refners, 705 F.2d at 531. This ignored the fact
that, at least until recently, it was thought that other environmental sources of lead could
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In Ethyl Corp., for example, one basis for the agency's decision to regu-
late lead in gasoline was the theory that children in urban areas ingested
airborne lead that fell to the ground and mixed with dust.223 The D.C.
Circuit held that a "supportable and reasonable hypothesis may well form
the basis for regulations ... ,224 This rule conflicts with what appears to
be the requirement in Benzene that the agency quantifiably demonstrate
that a benefit will occur as a result of the regulation imposed.225 When the
risk of harm is based only upon a medical theory, the agency will encoun-
ter serious difficulty in trying to quantify the likelihood of successful re-
duction of harm. This, in fact, occurred in Benzene, as OSHA had based
its standard primarily on the medical theory that no safe level of exposure
to a carcinogen exists.
Examination of cases involving varying degrees of certainty of the cause
and effect of toxic substances indicates that risk-benefit analysis is a more
successful test of significant risk in those cases where uncertainty is great.
Where the causal relationship between a toxic substance and its associated
harm is well understood, however, a stronger factual showing can be re-
quired to meet the significant risk test. In these circumstances, where cer-
tainty is great, the significant risk test should require a factual showing that
the toxic substance causes harm at a specific level of exposure and that
reducing exposure below that level will reduce the substance's adverse ef-
fects. Even where toxic substances are well understood, however, cause
and effect will be difficult to show where multiple sources are involved.
3. Economic Analysis
Small Re)fners is consistent with the treatment of economic analysis in
Cotton Dust and Weyerhaeuser. The SmallRefners court held that the uni-
form standard chosen was justified because the EPA had balanced the
health benefits against the cost to the industry as a whole. The court, hav-
ing found that lead from gasoline posed a significant health risk and that
reduction below the industry's dual standard was necessary,226 refused to
result in a low blood lead level background for members of urban populations. To have
banned lead in gasoline under such circumstances would not have resulted in reduced blood
lead levels unless the other lead sources were controlled. But see Mahaffey, Sources of Lead
in the Urban Environment, 73 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1357, 1358 (1983) (while the blood
lead burden attributed to lead from paint, leaded gasoline, and industrial emissions will vary
from location to location, recent studies have shown a general urban pattern of contamina-
tion consistent with the use of leaded gasoline).
223. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 43-46.
224. Id. at 44.
225. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
226. Small Refiners, 705 F.2d at 533.
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impose the requirement that the EPA analyze and compare the effective-
ness and costs of other alternatives. Thus, the court implicitly declined to
require the agency to consider alternative standards that might be equally
effective in reducing risk but less costly for industry. Further, the circuit
court refused to analyze whether the agency had chosen the most economi-
cally efficient standard that met the significant risk test. These types of
economic analyses--cost effectiveness and incremental cost-benefit balanc-
ing-were similarly rejected in Cotton Dust12" and Weyerhaeuser.
221
The rationale of the Supreme Court's decision in Cotton Dust was
grounded in the unique provision of the OSH Act requiring OSHA to reg-
ulate a toxic substance to the extent "feasible., 229 This provision indicates
that Congress was willing to have the agency focus on the benefits to
human health rather than on the costs incurred by industry. 23 ° The Court
also examined other statutes and noted that where Congress had intended
agencies to perform cost-benefit balancing, it had explicitly included the
requirement for such analysis in the statute.23' Since Congress had not
expressly included a cost-benefit provision in its statutory directive to
OSHA to promulgate health standards, the Court refused to impose
one.
232
In Weyerhaeuser, the D.C. Circuit's decision not to require incremental
227. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. In Cotton Dust, the Court implied
that cost-effectiveness analysis might be appropriate in some situations. See supra note 89
and accompanying text. OSHA, in fact, presently employs cost-effectiveness analysis in set-
ting health standards under § 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act. See OSHA to Use Four-Step in Set-
ting Standards, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, July 20, 1981, at 7. But see Note, Cost-
Beneft Anaysis, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and the Cotton Dust Standard.- A Matter of Life
andDeath, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 133, 135 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Cotton Dust
Standara], asserting that the logic of feasibility analysis neither requires nor permits cost-
effectiveness or cost-benefit analysis.
228. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
229. 29 U.S.C. § 6(b)(5) (1982), supra note 42 and accompanying text. Feasibility analy-
sis would seem to preclude simple, or net, cost-benefit balancing as well as incremented cost-
benefit balancing in that, under feasibility analysis, it is not necessary for the benefits of a
standard to outweigh its costs. It is, however, necessary that the standard be the most pro-
tective of feasible alternatives. See, e.g., Note, The Cotton Dust Standard, supra note 227, at
148 (cost-benefit analysis is incompatible with feasibility analysis). But see Cotton Dust, 452
U.S. at 544 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (interpreting the majority opinion as permitting, but
not requiring, use of cost-benefit analysis under § 6(b)(5)); Hadley & Richman, The Impact
of Benzene and Cotton Dust.- Restraints on the Regulation of Toxic Substances, 34 AD. L.
REV. 59, 68 (1982) (stating that it is unlikely that courts will interpret Cotton Dust to prohibit
use of cost-benefit analysis by OSHA under § 6(b)(5)).
230. Cotton Dust, 462 U.S. at 520-21.
231. Id at 510-11.




cost-benefit analysis was based upon a similar rationale. The court stated
that the cost of compliance, as determined from congressional intent, was a
minor provision. 233 It reasoned that requiring incremental cost-benefit
analysis would unnecessarily bog down the agency on a task that Congress
had not deemed important.234 The Weyerhaeuser court's refusal to require
incremental cost-benefit analysis was made more striking by the fact that
the EPA possessed such an analysis prepared by industry that supported
the agency's decisionmaking.235
The decision in Small Refiners to reject cost-benefit analysis was based
upon the same considerations as expressed in Cotton Dust and Weyerhaeu-
ser. Section 211 (c)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act, which authorized the EPA
to regulate lead, did not specifically require the use of cost-benefit analysis.
The court, therefore, refused to impose a requirement of such analysis on
the agency. Rather, it required the agency to show that it had balanced the
cost of the standard against the industry as a whole.236
The treatment of economic considerations in Small Refiners futher
reveals a serious shortcoming of the current model for judicial review of
environmental, safety and health rulemakings. While courts have inter-
preted many environmental statutes as limiting the extent to which agen-
cies may use economic analysis in setting standards, few courts have
explicitly clarified the types of analyses or the circumstances under which
such analyses may be permitted.237 In those situations, such as the Small
Refiners case, where evidence is available for quantifying the costs and
benefits of alternative standards, and where statutory directives do not pro-
233. Weyerhaueser, 590 F.2d at 1048.
234. Id.
235. Id The Weyerhaeuser court indicated, however, that a different result might have
been necessary if the industry's incremental cost-benefit analysis had revealed hidden costs
at high reduction levels. See supra note 161.
236. Small Refiners, 705 F.2d at 536.
237. It is unclear from Small Refiners the extent to which economic factors should be
considered in setting standards pursuant § 211 (c)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act. For example,
while the court refused to require incremental cost-benefit balancing, it implied that such
analysis might have been appropriate. Specifically, the court stated that it was troubled by
the EPA's failure "explicitly to consider the health benefits of alternative standards" but
could not say that the EPA's "balancing of costs against benefits was so seriously flawed that
the final rule . . . [was] unreasonable." Small Refners, 705 F.2d at 537. The court also
stated that deference to agency expertise did not relieve the EPA of its duty to explain why
the standard it chose was appropriate, and that the agency had ample data from which to
work. Id at 525, 531. Thus, the court was criticizing the EPA for not considering more
carefully the advantages and disadvantages of alternative standards that met the significant
risk test. The EPA, in fact, had sufficient data to perform incremental cost-benefit balanc-
ing, and thereby to choose the most economically efficient standard that sufficiently pro-
tected health. Moreover, although the court stated that the EPA had balanced costs against
benefits, the agency had never numerically estimated the anticipated costs and benefits of
1984] 1067
Catholic University Law Review
hibit such analysis, the court should encourage agencies to use systematic
economic techniques such as incremental cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness
analyses as part of the rulemaking record.238 While statutes and public
policy might not permit ultimate regulatory decisions to be based upon
such analyses, they can be used to provide insight into proposed regula-
tions.239 The quantification required to perform cost-benefit analysis is
the standard imposed. The court was referring, at best, to an intuitive cost-benefit analysis
on the part of the EPA.
In contrast to refusing to require cost-benefit balancing, the court permitted the EPA to
base its decision, in part, on an inter-refinery lead credit trading system. Id at 534-36. This
system allows those refiners who exceed the lead-content standards to purchase lead credits
from refiners who use less lead than the standard permits. 1d; see supra notes 192-95 and
accompanying text. By approving use of an inter-refinery lead credit trading system, the
court implicitly approved the use of cost-effectiveness analysis since the trading system was
one economic alternative that would satisfy the requirements of the new standard. Another
alternative would have been to have required all refiners to meet the standard on an individ-
ual basis. The latter alternative presumably would have had harsher economic effects but
might have been more protective in that less abuse of the lead reduction program would
have been possible.
238. The argument against using economic analysis as the sole basis for environmental
decisionmaking centers primarily on the capacity, and propriety, of using economic analysis
to assess environmental and health harms. Some parameters of environmental decisions,
such as the value of a clean river or the beauty of a forest, may be difficult or impossible to
quantify. Other parameters, such as the value of human life and freedom from suffering, are
both difficult to quantify and raise the moral question whether quantification should be
attempted at all. See Note, The Cotton Dust Standard, supra note 227, at 133. For a
thoughtful discussion of the inadequacies of using economic analysis in environmental deci-
sionmaking, see Sagoff, supra note 14, at 1410-12. The author explains that economic analy-
ses can measure the intensity with which individuals hold certain beliefs but cannot evaluate
the merits of those beliefs. Thus, an economist can measure how much a consumer is willing
to pay for a given level of environmental protection, but not how much the same individual,
acting as a citizen, values the same program. A consumer may, for example, acting in self-
interest, purchase a less expensive, but environmentally more harmful product. The same
individual, acting as a citizen, may vote for an economically inefficient environmental pro-
gram in the belief that the program is of great value to the community as a whole. While
economic techniques can measure consumer interests, they cannot adequately measure the
more intangible values that at least partially comprise environmental decisions. Id. William
Ruckelshaus, the current Administrator of the EPA, seemed to embrace this view when he
described the EPA's role as a "transcendent" obligation to protect human life and that
which sustains human life-the natural environment. Lash, EP4: hat Really Happened,
Wash. Post, July 29, 1984, at 8, col. 2 (Magazine). Environmental decisionmaking primarily
involves values that transcend economic choices, and economic choices alone cannot form
an adequate basis for such decisions. While economic analyses should not be used as the
sole basis for environmental decisions, they are, however, relevant in decisionmaking. Per-
haps, therefore, as noted ecologist Eugene P. Odum has suggested, "[s]omehow, ecology and
economics must be merged." E. ODUM, FUNDAMENTALS OF EcOLOGY 431 (3d ed. 1971).
239. See Kasper, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Decisionmaking, 45 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1013, 1022 (1977) (maintaining that the difficulties encountered in performing cost-
benefit analysis of environmental problems help to focus the decisionmaker on which issues
still need to be resolved); see also Fisher, Controlling Government Regulation: Cost-Benefit
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likely to force the agency to analyze rigorously the issues it faces in its
rulemaking, thereby encouraging thoroughly reasoned decisionmaking.
Despite its flaws, Small Refiners may represent an extension of an appar-
ent trend within the D.C. Circuit to examine more carefully the economic
impact of environmental regulations. In contrast with Ethyl Corp., for ex-
ample, Small Refiners restricted the agency's discretion to implement pro-
tective standards by requiring some consideration of the cost of the
standard. In Ethyl Corp., the court indicated that the EPA might actually
be precluded from considering economic factors in promulgating stan-
dards pursuant to section 21 l(c)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act.24 ° Small Re-
finers, on the other hand, clearly held that, in reviewing the EPA's most
recent section 211 (c)(1)(A) standard, economic factors must be considered
because the EPA had considered economic costs as one factor in its
rulemaking and nothing in the plain language or legislative history of the
statute precluded economic analysis from being considered. 24 ' The court's
shift in emphasis regarding economic considerations may reflect the influ-
ence of three factors: the impact of Benzene and Cotton Dust, the eco-
nomic slowdown of the mid-to-late 1970's, particularly with respect to the
increasing cost of energy; and the relative success of early environmental
regulations.
It is possible that the Ethyl Corp. decision would not have been reached,
based on the evidence presented, if it had been decided after Benzene and
Cotton Dust. Essentially, both Benzene and Cotton Dust were responses by
the Supreme Court to industry challenges, on economic grounds, of the
particular standards promulgated.242 Benzene formed an initial method
for screening decisions that would impose costs on industry, ensuring that
sufficient justification for the proposed standard existed by applying a
cause-and-effect significant-risk test.243 Cotton Dust, although it did not
impose cost-benefit analysis, contained clear admonitions against a policy
Analysis Before and After the Cotton Dust Case, 36 AD. L. REV. 179, 183 (1984) (cost-benefit
analysis enables agency and public to examine project rationale and assumptions); Sagoff,
supra note 14, at 1400, 1413 (cost-benefit analysis may be a relevant source of supplemental
evidence in environmental policymaking, but nonmarket convictions supersede economic
techniques).
240. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 54 n.124.
241. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 63 and 79 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 67, 221 and accompanying text. When Ethyl Corp. was decided,
§ 211 of the Clean Air Act required EPA to find, prior to regulating a fuel additive, that the
additive would endanger public health. Small Refiners, 705 F.2d at 514 n. 12. This could
easily have been interpreted to require a cause-and-effect showing that lead in gasoline
caused actual harm. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 95 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). Such
a showing could not have been established at that time.
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of providing absolute safety for workers at any CoSt. 2 " Thus, in cases such
as Ethyl Corp., where it cannot be shown with certainty that a toxic sub-
stance contributes to health impairment, both the Benzene significant risk
test and the Cotton Dust policy against providing absolute safety irrespec-
tive of costs indicate that economic considerations must begin to take prec-
edence over unproved adverse health effects.245
The economic slowdown of the 1970's has also led to greater judicial
consideration of economic factors, particularly when the cost of energy is
involved. In Sierra Club, for example, the D.C. Circuit permitted the EPA
to implement standards that were less rigorous than the industry was capa-
ble of achieving.246 Specifically, the court permitted the use of a sliding-
scale standard by which greater amounts of sulfur oxides could be dis-
charged when high-sulfur coal was burned.247 Although the court held
that both the plain meaning and legislative history of the Clean Air Act
permitted this regulatory scheme, 248 to some extent its decision may have
been influenced by the potential impact of sulfur oxide standards on the
cost of electricity generated by affected plants.
249
Finally, the environmental improvements that have been made to date
may have created room to consider economic factors more carefully. The
legislative history of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 indicates, for ex-
ample, that, at that time, the costs in terms of medical care and agricultural
disruption of the deleterious effects of air pollutants possibly outweighed
the costs of correction. 250 Regulatory programs, such as the EPA's phase-
down of lead in gasoline, have eased to some extent the deleterious effects
244. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., Langbein, Water, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD ENVIRONMENT 1973: A RE-
VIEW AND APPRAISAL 42, 48 (N.Y. Academy of Sciences 1973) ("to avoid all perceptible
danger as a matter of policy is either costly or likely to lead to [the] worse danger of asceptic
inactivity.").
246. Sierra Club, 567 F.2d at 321.
247. Id. at 316, 410.
248. Id. at 321.
249. Id. 313. The court stated that the importance of the standard arose not only from
the environmental and health interests involved, but also from the impact of the emission
controls on the economy. The potential effect on the economy was heightened by the in-
creasing trend among utilities to burn coal, an abundant energy source that could replace
scarcer fuels, to produce electricity. Id The cost of the revised NSPS litigated in Sierra
Club has been estimated as tens of billions of dollars. Ackerman and Hassler, Beyond the
NewDeal: Coalandthe Clean AirAct, 89 YALE L. J. 1466 (1980). In addition, recent opin-
ion polls have indicated that the public does not favor protecting the environment if that
prevents obtaining an adequate supply of energy. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 410 (1980).
250. 116 CONG. REC. 33,091-92 (1970).
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of some toxic substances. 25' Thus, the cost of further reducing lead in gas-
oline becomes more important as statutory goals are reached. Toxic sub-
stances are, however, a continuing problem and greater understanding of
disease mechanisms permits continual refinements in determining what
level of exposure constitutes a hazard.252
Thus the cumulative effect of the Benzene and Cotton Dust decisions, the
decreased economic productivity of the 1970's, and the successful environ-
mental efforts to date may have influenced the Small Refiners court to fo-
cus more carefully on economic factors when reviewing environmental
rulemaking. SmallRfiners, in turn, suggests a trend in the D.C. Circuit to
more carefully review economic costs of environmental, safety and health
regulations.
III. CONCLUSION
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in Small Refners Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA applied what is
becoming a standard model for review of health, safety and environmental
rulemaking. In Small Refners, the court essentially had an ideal factual
background for application of the current model in that evidence of a di-
rect causal relationship between the substance regulated and its health ef-
fects was available. By examining how the model works under the facts of
Small Refners, however, it should be clear that elements of the model are
easily misapplied. For example, in applying the significant-risk test to cir-
cumstances in which cause and effect are uncertain, courts should consider
using risk-benefit analysis rather than requiring an agency to quantify both
the risk of the harm andthe likelihood of alleviating that harm through the
regulation imposed. This would permit agencies to regulate on the basis of
accepted but unproven scientific theories, or in cases where multiple
251. See, e.g., Small Refiners, 705 F.2d at 527-31.
252. See, e.g., id. at 530 (early studies indicating maximum safe level of blood lead at 30
Lg/dl superseded by more recent studies indicating maximum safe level as 10 ,±g/dl); see
also Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 301 n.16 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Decisions . . . may become
[arbitrary] . . . by dint of scientific advancement. By its use of. . . sparse data, the EPA
creates a continuing responsibility to develop, review and apply . . . more sophisticated
information."); PCB and Dioxin Cases, Hearing Before the Oversight and Investigations Sub-
comm. of the House Energy and Commerce Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1982) (testi-
mony of Dr. Vernon Houk, Centers for Disease Control) ("[H]istorically ... as we learn
more about [hazardous] substances, we generally find they are more toxic than we
thought."); Reasons Underlying the Registration Decisions Concerning DDT, 2,4, 5-T Aldrin
and Dieldrin, Before the Environmental Protection Agency, I ENVrL. L. REP. 30,028, 30,029
(Mar. 18, 1971) (the safety of a product is an evolving concept which is constantly being
refined in the light of increasing knowledge).
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sources of a toxic substance contribute to harm and it is unclear that regu-
lating only one source will alleviate the harm.
Where, on the other hand, extensive scientific evidence of cause and ef-
fect is available, the model should encompass the use of cost-benefit analy-
sis as one part of the rulemaking record. In such cases, careful economic
analysis can be used to identify and examine hidden costs of a proposed
regulation and the possible advantages of alternatives. Courts applying
the current model for review of environmental rulemakings, however,
have not required the use of cost-benefit analysis unless it is specifically
called for by statute. Thus in Small Refners, even though sufficient data
were available for more careful examination of alternatives, the court did
not require or encourage use of cost-benefit analysis.
Nonetheless, Small Refners indicates a greater emphasis on economic
considerations in setting standards for toxic substances than has been
shown by courts in the past. It may represent a trend in the District of
Columbia Circuit toward a more restrictive view of agency discretion to
implement toxic substance regulations. This more restrictive view, how-
ever, should be applied only in those situations where the causes of the
harmful effects of a toxic substance or industrial practice can be shown
with a high degree of certainty.
Michael Cooke
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